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ARTICLES
TORTIOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT AND THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT: TORT,
BREACH OF CONTRACT, OR
BOTH?
Brian R. Levey*
Each year, the federal government enters into millions of contracts worth
billions of dollars.' Unfortunately, the sheer number, size, and complexity
of the contracts and the goods and services procured inevitably give rise to
tortious conduct by government employees relating to those contracts. Such
tortious conduct may occur throughout the procurement cycle, and may
take many forms, ranging from simple negligence to intentional misrepresen-
tation. In addition, such tortious activity may constitute a breach of an im-
plied or express term of a contract, commonly referred to as a tortious
breach of contract. Thus, in many cases it is possible to maintain an action
in either tort or contract.
* Assistant General Counsel, PRC Inc., McLean, Virginia. B.B.A. 1984, University of
Notre Dame; J.D. 1987, The Catholic University of America; LL.M. 1992, The George Wash-
ington University. This Article is based on a thesis submitted to the faculty of The National
Law Center of The George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the Master of Laws degree. Mr. Levey would like to thank Professor John Cibinic, Jr. of
The National Law Center, who directed the thesis, and Herbert L. Fenster and Thomas A.
Lemmer of McKenna & Cuneo for their insights. In a case specifically cited in this Article,
Mr. Levey, while an associate with McKenna & Cuneo, assisted Mr. Fenster and Mr. Lemmer
in the firm's representation of a contractor seeking redress for the government's tortious
breach of contract. See General Dynamics Corp., 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,657, at 123,003
(1991); infra note 86. The views expressed in this Article, however, are those of the Author
and do not necessarily represent the views of McKenna & Cuneo, General Dynamics Corpora-
tion, or PRC Inc.
1. According to the General Services Administration, in fiscal year 1991, the federal
government entered into 20,152,308 contract awards, modifications, and other actions worth
$210,689,057,000. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA CENTER, U.S. GENERAL SERVICES AD-
MIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPORT 2 (1992). These contracts are for products as diverse
as messenger services and monorail systems. See Marshall J. Doke, Jr., The Scope of Govern-
ment Contracts, 28 PUB. CoNT. NEWS 26 (1992) (citing Loop to Loop Messenger Serv.,
Comp. Gen. B-241068, 90-2 CPD 519 (1990) (messenger services); Kimmins Contracting
Corp., 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,914 (1991) (monorail system)).
Catholic University Law Review
In a suit between private parties, the victim of a tortious breach of con-
tract typically pleads both contract and tort theories together in the same
action. The goal of this strategy is to recover punitive damages, which are
not available in actions brought solely for breach of contract. A different set
of considerations arises, however, when the alleged tort-feasor is a govern-
ment employee, the allegedly tortious conduct relates to a federal govern-
ment contract, and the complaining party is a federal government
contractor. In such cases, the contractor must confront the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity and the anomalies created by Congress in its limited waiv-
ers of that immunity.2 Most significantly, the contractor may not bring tort
and contract claims against the federal government in the same forum.
More specifically, a tort claim may be brought only in federal district court,
while a contract claim may be heard only in the United States Claims Court
or before the various agency boards of contract appeals.
This Article attempts to guide the government contractor through the ju-
risdictional maze created for suits filed against the sovereign so that the con-
tractor may bring an actionable claim in the proper forum. In order to
achieve this goal, this Article first briefly explores the distinctions between
tort and contract claims at common law. This Article then presents an over-
view of the jurisdictional scheme for tort and contract claims against the
federal government. Next, this Article analyzes factors that the various fed-
eral forums have identified for distinguishing between tort and contract
claims. Finally, this Article examines how the forums apply these factors to
specific types of actions brought against the government.
I. COMMON LAW TORT CONTRACT DISTINCTIONS
A. Historical Overview
Historically, actions in contract3 developed out of tort theory.4 The earli-
est origins of both actions can be traced to the writ of trespass proper, under
which the plaintiff could recover in cases where the defendant directly inter-
2. For example, punitive damages are not available in contract or tort actions against the
federal government. See, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) (provid-
ing that the United States shallnot be liable for punitive damages in tort actions); Garrett v.
United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 204 (1988) (denying punitive damages in a contract action against the
United States).
3. WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 469 (7th ed. 1982).
See, e.g., The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988) (providing that the United
States shall not be liable for punitive damages in tort actions); Garrett v. United States, 15 Cl.
Ct. 204 (1988) (denying punitive damages in a contract action against the United States).
4. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at
658 (5th ed. 1984).
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fered with the plaintiff's body, land, or goods.' Out of trespass proper
emerged the action of trespass on the case, under which the plaintiff could
recover where the plaintiff voluntarily entrusted his person or his goods to
the defendant.6 Such cases typically arose in the context of "the rendition of
services on the part of those engaged in a public trade or calling."7
At first, liability for trespass on the case was based on the tort theory-
breach of a legal duty to render services with some degree of skill and care.'
In time, courts also began to base liability on the defendant's implied prom-
ise, or "assumpsit," to render the service with reasonable skill and care.9
Thus, in cases of misfeasance, where the defendant failed to exercise reason-
able care,' the defendant could be held liable in tort or contract. Subse-
quently, contract liability expanded to include nonfeasance, i.e., situations
where the defendant failed to perform at all. 1
B. Modern Distinctions
Out of the historic origins of tort and contract liability arose distinctions
that remain meaningful both in defining the causes of action and in deter-
mining when tort and contract actions may exist simultaneously.' 2 Today,
although the line between tort and contract has become blurred,' 3 tort liabil-
ity still is said to be imposed by law and is generally limited to misfeasance.' 4
Contract liability, on the other hand, is premised on an individual's promise
and extends to both misfeasance and nonfeasance.'i Generally, then, where
5. FRIEDRICH KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 26
(2d ed. 1970) (citing Stroud F.C. Milsom, Trespass from Henry III to Edward III, 74 L.Q.
REV. 195, 407, 561 (1958)).
6. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 5, at 26.
7. KEETON, supra note 4, at 658; see also KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 5, at 26.
8. KEETON, supra note 4, at 658; see also KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 5, at 26.
9. KEETON, supra note 4, at 658 (citing 3 THOMAS A. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL LIABILITY 173 (1906)); see also KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 5, at 26.
10. KEETON, supra note 4, at 658.
11. KESSLER & GILMORE, supra note 5, at 26-27.
12. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 4, at 658-59; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469; 1 CHITrY
ON CONTRACTS 8-9 (26th ed. 1989).
13. See, e.g., "Hello Partner": Lender Liability and Equitable Subordination, in 1 AD-
VANCED BANKRUPTCY WORKSHOP 1990, at 14-15 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 601, 1992) ("As business becomes more complex and the social demands
increase, tort duties and damage compensation have been applied to contract matters.").
14. See KEETON, supra note 4, at 656-58; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469-70. Compare
Rawson v. United Steel Workers of Am., 726 P.2d 742 (Idaho 1986), vacated mem. on other
grounds, 482 U.S. 901 (1987) (holding that a union's actual performance of an inspection in a
negligent manner is an act of misfeasance that gives rise to an action in tort) with Carroll v.
United Steel Workers of Am., 692 P.2d 361 (Idaho 1984) (holding that a union's failure to
perform a safety inspection is an act of nonfeasance that, even if it amounted to willful neglect
to perform a contract, is insufficient to give rise to an action in tort).
15. See KEETON, supra note 4, at 656-58; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469-70.
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the actionable conduct involves misfeasance, both causes of action may lie.'6
However, where the conduct, or more typically lack of conduct, involves
nonfeasance, only an action in contract will lie.' 7
The most significant consequences of the remaining common law tort/
contract distinctions arise in the area of damages."8 It is well established
that damages for breach of contract are limited to those that the defendant
had reason to foresee when he entered into the contract. 19
By contrast, the defendant to a tort action may be held liable for damages
beyond those he had reason to foresee.20 In tort, foreseeability generally is
relevant only as to the question of whether the defendant is liable and not as
to the measure or amount of that liability. 2 '
A second and increasingly more important distinction concerns the availa-
bility of punitive damages. It is well settled that "[p]unitive damages are not
recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the
breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.", 22 The
16. See KEETON, supra note 4, at 656-58; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469-70.
17. See KEETON, supra note 4, at 656-58; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469-70. Of course,
like most general rules, there are exceptions. As Prosser notes:
One is that a common carrier, or other public utility, which has undertaken the duty
of serving the public, becomes liable in tort when it fails to do so, whether or not it
has made a contract. Another is that a defendant who makes a contract without the
intention to perform it is regarded as committing a form of misrepresentation, or
fraud, for which a tort action of deceit will lie. The special relation of landlord and
tenant is held by some courts to give rise to a tort obligation when the landlord
makes a covenant to repair the premises and does not do so.
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 469 (citations omitted).
18. An additional consequence of the remaining tort/contract distinctions is the potential
for differing statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1991)
(analyzing whether medical malpractice action sounds in tort or contract for purposes of stat-
ute of limitations); see also KEETON, supra note 4, at 664 n.76; PROSSER, supra note 3, at 470
(citing Webber v. Herkimer & Mohawk St. R.R., 16 N.E. 358 (N.Y. 1888)).
19. See, e.g., 5 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1019 (1964). Damages
also may be expressly limited in the contract by disclaimer or warranty provisions. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.; see also EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT
LAW 1076-77 (2d ed. 1977). Of course, in strict liability cases, foreseeability is actually irrele-
vant to liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); see also Brink's, Inc. v. City of
New York, 717 F.2d 700, 704 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that although punitive damages are not
available for "mere breach of contract," New York law does not preclude award of punitive
damages where conduct that gives rise to contract action also is tortious); Schaefer v. Miller,
587 A.2d 491, 492 (Md. 1991) (prohibiting punitive damages in "pure action for breach of
contract," although punitive damages have been permitted in torts arising out of contracts in
cases of tortious interference and conversion where actual malice was demonstrated). Addi-
tional exceptions exist; courts have awarded punitive damages in the following contract
actions: (1) breach of a promise to marry, HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 11.03[l], at 11-13 (1986) (citing Goldstein v. Young, 23 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1945);
Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 77 (1791); LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
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general lack of recoverability of punitive damages in contract flows from the
historical belief that "[b]reaches of contract ... do not in general cause as
much resentment or other mental and physical discomfort as do the wrongs
called torts and crimes."23 Thus, the plaintiff in a suit between private par-
ties involving a tortious breach of contract typically pleads both contract
and tort actions together in the same action with the goal of obtaining puni-
tive damages in addition to those available solely for actions in contract.
II. OVERVIEW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
When the plaintiff is a victim of a tortious breach of contract committed
by the government, as opposed to a private party, a broad range of addi-
tional issues arise over the extent to which the government has waived its
CONTRACTS § 195, at 394 (2d ed. 1965)); (2) breach of a contract whose performance is a
public duty (e.g., breach by a public utility or common carrier, HUNTER, supra (citing Trout v.
Watkins Livery & Undertaking Co., 130 S.W. 136 (Mo. App. 1910)), (3) breach of a fiduciary
duty, HUNTER, supra (citing PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36
(D.C. Cir. 1958)), and (4) breach of a contract with malice or fraud, CORBIN, supra note 19,
§ 1077, at 178-81 (Supp. 1992) (citing Glidden v. Skinner, 458 A.2d 1142 (Vt. 1983); Vernon
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976); Jones v. Abriani, 350 N.E.2d
635 (Ind. App. 1976)); see also 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 753-54 (1988) (granting punitive
damages where "special relationships," such as fiduciary duties, existed and where the breach
included fraud or abusive behavior); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 14-4, at 521 (2d ed. 1977) (awarding punitive damages where the breach
"involves the malicious or wanton violation of a fiduciary duty").
23. CORBIN, supra note 19, § 1077. In cases where the facts give rise to both contract and
tort actions, and where issues such as applicable damages and statutes of limitations arise, the
plaintiff at some point in the proceedings may be forced to choose which cause of action to
pursue. See generally 1 AM. JUR. 2D Actions § 32 (1962) (discussing "[e]lection between ac-
tions ex delicto and actions ex contractu"). Courts have generally adhered to one of two views.
The first allows the plaintiff to elect or choose his cause of action, the second permits courts
themselves to determine the gravamen of the claim and "elect" for the plaintiff. See KEETON,
.supra note 4, § 93 at 666. Unfortunately for potential plaintiffs, there is little consistency
among courts as to which approach will be followed. At least one commentator has ventured
to generalize courts' application of these two views as follows:
Where the particular point at issue is one of adjective law only, affecting the suit or
its procedure, but not the merits of the cause of action, the courts have tended to be
quite liberal in giving the plaintiff his freedom of choice, and have upheld his action
of tort of contract as he has seen fit to bring it. Likewise where the point is one
affecting substantive rights, but the claim is one for damages to property or to pecu-
niary interests only, the tendency has been, with some occasional dissent, to allow the
election. But when the claim is one for personal injury, the decision usually has been
that the gravamen of the action is the misconduct and the damage, and that it is
essentially one of tort, which the plaintiff cannot alter by his pleading. This has the
odd result that the negligence of an attorney will survive the death of his client, while
that of a physician is oft interred with his patient's bones. Actually, the courts ap-
pear to have preserved a great deal of flexibility, and to have been influenced in their
decisions by their attitude toward the rule of law in question.
Id. at 666-67 (citations omitted).
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immunity as sovereign. Historically, the United States has been immune
from suit except where Congress has waived that immunity and specifically
consented to certain limited types of actions.2 4 Unfortunately, Congress has
chosen to waive its tort and contract immunity in a piecemeal fashion. Con-
sequently, when the federal government subjects a contractor to a tortious
breach of contract, the contractor must weave through a complex jurisdic-
tional maze in order to identify the forum in which to bring its claim. Three
forums may be available: (1) the federal district courts;" (2) the United
States Claims Court;26 and (3) the various agency boards of contract ap-
peals.27 Jurisdiction, however, is limited: tort claims may be brought only in
district court, while contract claims generally may be brought only in the
Claims Court or before an agency board.28
Confronted with forums of limited jurisdiction, contractors face the
daunting task of distinguishing between tort and contract actions, or perhaps
equally as often, demonstrating that a single set of facts might give rise to a
cause of action in both tort and contract. This task includes an analysis of
the jurisdictional standards articulated by each of the three forums. To de-
termine whether a claim sounds in tort, the federal district courts look to
state law and to whether there is a breach of a specific contractual obliga-
tion.29  To determine whether an action lies in contract, the Claims Court
examines whether the claim alleges a breach of a primarily contractual un-
dertaking or a tort independent of the contract,3° while the agency boards
examine whether the claim alleges a breach relating to a contract. 3, Finally,
the contractor must be aware that the choice of whether to characterize the
claim as a tort or contract may have significant consequences.32
A. The Court of Claims Act
American courts began to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity early
in the history of this country, deriving the theory from the English principle
24. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950) (holding the government not
liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries occurring to serviceman arising from
their course of duty).
25. 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(2) (1988).
26. Id. § 609(a)(1). Effective January 1, 1993, the United States Claims Court is known
as the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
27. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1988).
28. But see infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Little Tucker Act,
under which the district courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over certain contract claims
under $10,000).
29. See infra part III.
30. See infra part IV.
31. See infra part V.
32. See infra part II.F (discussing election and foreclosure under 28 U.S.C. § 1500).
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that the King could do no wrong.3" Thus, from the passage of the Constitu-
tion through the mid-i 850s, private citizens had no judicial remedy for tort
or contract claims against the federal government.34
As early as 1792, however, the United States offered compensation for its
wrongs in the form of private relief bills.a5 This arrangement proved un-
manageable, however, for by 1832 Congress was spending fully half of its
time adjudicating private bills of one kind or another.3 6 By 1848, the flood
of requests for relief reached crisis proportions, prompting Congress to con-
sider nine different bills between 1849 and 1855 for the creation of judicial
bodies to address claims.
37
Unfortunately, when Congress finally did take action, it addressed only
half of the problem. By the Act of February 24, 1855, Congress created the
Court of Claims to "hear and determine all claims ... upon any contract,
express or implied."' 38 The Act was silent as to jurisdiction over tort claims,
leading the Supreme Court to conclude that the Court of Claims should have
no such jurisdiction.39 In this vein, the Supreme Court merely perceived
33. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
34. For historical overviews of the claims process, see 2 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 51-60 (1991); PETER S. LATHAM, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT Dis-
PUTES chap. 2 (1986); Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625
(1985), reprinted in 22 YEARBOOK OF PROCUREMENT ARTICLES 590 (1985).
35. See WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 2 (1957) (indicating
that the first tort claim granted by a private bill was for relief for damages caused to premises
occupied by United States troops).
36. See Shimomura, supra note 34, at 644.
37. Id. at 649-50.
38. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612.
39. As the Supreme Court noted:
The language of the statutes which confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims,
excludes by the strongest implication demands against the government founded on
torts. The general principle which we have already stated as applicable to all govern-
ments, forbids, on a policy imposed by necessity, that they should hold themselves
liable for unauthorized wrongs inflicted by their officers on the citizen, though occur-
ring while engaged in the discharge of official duties.
Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1869) (indicating that a government
officer who allegedly pressured a defendant into renewing a contract may be guilty of the tort
of duress over which the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction). In Gibbons, the Supreme Court
also established that artful pleading which seeks to invoke the Court of Claims' jurisdiction
would not be tolerated:
But it is not to be disguised that this case is an attempt, under the assumption of an
implied contract, to make the government responsible for the unauthorized acts of its
officer, those acts being in themselves torts. No government has ever held itself liable
to individuals for the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of power by its
officers and agents.
Id. at 274. But see United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888) (expressing no opinion as to
whether a patentee may waive any infringement by the government and sue upon an implied
contract); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885) (explaining that
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itself to be implementing the will of Congress consistent with Congress' lim-
ited waiver of sovereign immunity, noting that "in establishing a court in
which the United States may primarily be sued as defendants, [Congress]
proceeded slowly and with great caution."' 4
B. The Tucker Act
If any doubt remained as to whether the Court of Claims had tort jurisdic-
tion, Congress, with the passage of the Tucker Act in 1887, made its position
clear: "the Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine...
[a]ll claims founded upon .. .any contract, express or implied, with the
Government of the United States... in cases not sounding in tort."4 1 Subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions consistently enforced Congress' express
exclusion.42
While the Tucker Act expressly limited the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims, section 2 of the Act expanded the jurisdiction of the district courts
and courts of appeals to include contract claims against the United States.43
This provision was commonly referred to as the "Little Tucker Act" because
it placed jurisdictional dollar limits on such claims.44 Like the Tucker Act,
when the government uses a patented invention for its benefit, and the right of the patentee is
acknowledged, the government has created an implied-in-fact contract); United States v. Great
Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884) (establishing that when the government seizes admittedly
private land for public use, the government has created an implied contract to compensate the
owner). Throughout the 1880s, the government was still enjoying sovereign immunity from its
torts.
40. Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 344 (1880) (explaining that government of-
ficers who seized private property, wrongfully claiming it to be government property, were
guilty of a tort over which the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction).
41. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Harley v. United States, 198 U.S. 229, 234 (1905). In Harley, the Supreme
Court noted:
We held in Russell v. United States, that in order to give the Court of Claims jurisdic-
tion, under the act of March 3, 1887, defining claims of which the Court of Claims
had jurisdiction, the demand sued on must be founded on "a convention between the
parties-'a coming together of minds.'" And we excluded, as not meeting this con-
dition, those contracts or obligations that the law is said to imply from a tort.
Id. (citations omitted).
43. Section 2 of the Act stated as follows:
That the district courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Claims as to all matters named in the preceding section where the
amount of the claim does not exceed one thousand dollars, and the circuit courts of
the United States shall have such concurrent jurisdiction in all cases where the
amount of such claim exceeds one thousand dollars and does not exceed ten thou-
sand dollars. All causes brought and tried under the provisions of this act shall be
tried by the court without a jury.
Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 stat. 505.
44. See id. For references to the "Little Tucker Act," see, e.g., Franchi v. Manbeck, 972
F.2d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Bobula v. United States Dep't of Justice, 970 F.2d 854, 856
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however, the Little Tucker Act did not afford relief to victims of tortious
government conduct.45
C. The Federal Tort Claims Act
While the Court of Claims Act and the Tucker Act perhaps initially af-
forded Congress some relief from the adjudicative burden of private relief
bills, that relief was incomplete. Congress still faced the task of resolving
tort claims through consideration of private relief bills. As the role of the
federal government continued to expand over time, so inevitably did the tor-
tious conduct of its employees.46 Unfortunately, the use of private relief bills
to seek relief from this ever-increasing tortious conduct proved to be "notori-
ously clumsy," overburdening Congress to such an extent that by the 1940s
Congress was considering up to 2,300 bills per term.47
In order to remove the burden of administering private relief bills, Con-
gress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).48 The FTCA substituted
the federal district courts for Congress as the adjudicators of the tort liability
of the United States.49 As a general proposition, the Act makes the United
(Fed. Cir. 1992); UNR Indus., Inc. v. United States, 962 F.2d 1013, 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
cert. granted sub. nom. Keene Corp. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 149 U.S. 593 (1893) (indicating that, under the Act of
March 3, 1887, chapter 359, the circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction over a
claim for damages for unauthorized use of property by the government because it is a case
sounding in tort).
46. See JAYSON, supra note 34, § 58, at 2-51.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941), quoted in Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953).
48. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, title IV, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812. As
the Supreme Court stated in Dalehite:
[The FTCA] was the offspring of a feeling that the Government should assume the
obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees in carrying out its
work.... Some simplified recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative.
This Act was Congress' solution, affording instead easy and simple access to the
federal courts for torts within its scope.
Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25.
49. Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat.
812. The FTCA also granted authority to the head of each federal agency to adjudicate tort
claims of less than $1,000. Id.
Today, the jurisdictional statement provides that:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . on claims against the
United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
It is worth noting that there is no intrinsic logic in giving tort jurisdiction to courts of
general jurisdiction while reserving contract jurisdiction for a specialized court. Indeed, earlier
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States liable in tort to the extent that a private party would be liable under
the law of the state where the tortious conduct occurred. 50
Although the FTCA "waives the Government's immunity from suit in
sweeping language," 5 Congress expressly excluded several types of actions
from the FrCA's coverage.52 Most notable among these exclusions are: (1)
the discretionary function exception, which excludes claims based upon any
act or omission of a federal employee exercising due care in the execution of
a statute or regulation, or upon the performance or failure to perform a dis-
cretionary function;53 and (2) the intentional tort exception, which excludes
"[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, de-
ceit, or interference with contract rights."54 Finally, the FTCA expressly
states that the United States shall not be liable for punitive damages.55
D. The Contract Disputes Act
While the Court of Claims and federal district courts enjoyed express stat-
utory authority to hear contract and tort claims respectively, historically the
boards of contract appeals operated under no such statutory mandate.
Rather, the boards gradually evolved over time, based on agencies' authority
to resolve certain claims under the disputes clause contained in federal gov-
ernment contracts.56 During the nineteenth century, the first disputes clause
provided that "[i]f any doubts or disputes arise as to the meaning of anything
in the contract, drawings, plans, or specifications.., the matter shall be at
bills had conferred jurisdiction over tort claims on the district courts, on the Court of Claims,
and on both concurrently. See JAYSON, supra note 34, § 59.03, at 2-60.
Congress has revised the FTCA several times since its enactment in 1946. In 1948, Con-
gress reorganized Title 28 of the United States Code, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, includ-
ing the jurisdictional statement of the FTCA. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 646 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988)). The 1948 revisions maintained the authority of the agency heads to
adjudicate claims. Congress again amended the FTCA in 1966, revising the FTCA so that,
under 28 U.S.C. § 2675, all claims must be filed with an administrative agency for disposition
prior to filing in district court. Act of November 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-348, 79 Stat. 1310
(repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2673).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
51. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951).
52. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
53. See id. § 2680(a).
54. Id. § 2680(h).
55. Id. § 2674.
56. For historical overviews of the evolution of the boards of contract appeals, see PETER
S. LATHAM, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DISPUTES 11-21 (1980); Austin G. Roe, Lincoln: The
First Board of Contract Appeals, 8 PuB. CONT. L.J. 179 (1976).
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once referred to the Secretary of the Navy." '57 By World War I, however,
the volume of contract claims became too large for the various department
secretaries to address.5" Consequently, the individual departments created
boards of contract appeals to adjudicate contract claims arising under the
disputes clause.59 These boards gradually evolved into today's "highly de-
veloped quasi-judicial institutions specially designed to hear and decide
claims which arise during performance of government contracts."
6
Because the boards' authority to decide disputes arose from the disputes
clause, their "jurisdiction" was limited by the express language of the clause
to claims "arising under the contract;" thus, the boards had jurisdiction over
"cases only when the contract contained a clause providing for the remedy
requested by the contractor. '61 Such clauses included the changes clause
and suspension of work clause.62 However, the boards had no authority to
hear claims "relating to the contract"; thus, breach of contract claims over
which there were no remedy-granting clauses fell outside the scope of the
disputes clause.6a Consequently, the boards consistently denied jurisdiction
to contractor claims alleging tortious breach of contract. 
6
57. F. Trowbridge vom Baur, Fifty Years of Government Contract Law, 29 FED. B.J. 305,
311 (1970) (alterations in original), reprinted in 8 YEARBOOK OF PROCUREMENT ARTICLES 1,
9 (John W. Whelan, ed., 1971).
58. See LATHAM, supra note 56, at 13.
59. Id.
60. Roe, supra note 56, at 179.
61. See JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS 898 (2d ed. 1985) (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S.
394 (1966)).
62. See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 61, at 898.
63. Id. at 898-99.
64. See, e.g., Helicopter Servs., Inc., 80-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,190, at 69,851 (1979) ("If
there is any claim against the Government it would have to be a tort claim which is outside the
jurisdiction of this Board under 7 CFR 24.4(a) and the Disputes clause of the contract.");
Delphi Indus., 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 13,058, at 63,756 (1978) ("There is no provision in the
contract under which relief from torts can be granted, and 'the Board's power to grant relief
must be found within the "four corners" of the contract.' ") (citations omitted); George
DeBarros, 80-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,229, at 70,102 (1980) ("[A]n award of damages for breach
of contract is a remedy which is not available under the specific provisions of the contract...
it is also well established that a claim for relief sounding in tort is outside the jurisdiction of
this Board under 7 CFR 24.4(a) and the Disputes clause .. "); Lenoir Wood Finishing Co.,
1964 B.C.A. (CCH) T 4111, at 20,061 (1964) ("This Board has repeatedly held that cases
which sound in tort or purely in breach of contract are beyond its authority to adjust. In many
instances factual situations which otherwise would be regarded as contractual breaches may be
adjusted within the framework of a contract because the instrument itself anticipated and
therefore provided for such .... Absent such a clause, the Board is without authority to grant
relief.") (citations omitted); Joseph F. Monsini, Jr., 61-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 3197, at 16,570
(1961) ("We are limited in this instance to the enforcement of such rights as are provided by
the contract itself.... The gravamen of the complaint is the misrepresentation of the Mess
Officer. The contract does not provide compensation for such an act."); Gas Equip. & Air
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By contrast, the Court of Claims enjoyed jurisdiction over breach claims
under the Tucker Act. 6' This jurisdictional distinction between the boards
and the Court of Claims was one of many that had evolved through an ad
hoc combination of legislation and judicial decisions.66 With the passage of
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), however, Congress for the first
time, comprehensively revised the disputes process.67 As part of this reor-
ganization, Congress expanded the boards' jurisdiction, vesting the boards
with the authority to adjudicate claims "relating to a contract," and with the
power to grant relief in contract claims consistent with that of the Claims
Court. 68 The CDA obviated the need for a remedy-granting clause where a
plaintiff sought to invoke a board's jurisdiction.69 Thus, the CDA vested the
boards, for the first time, with jurisdiction over breach of contract claims.7°
Conditioning Co., 58-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1826, at 7220 (1958) ("This is not a claim cognizable
under the contract but sounds in tort.").
65. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
66. See JOHN W. WHELAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CON-
TRACTS 668-72 (1985).
67. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383-91 (codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 (1988 & Supp.
11 1990)).
68. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1988). However, boards and the Court of Claims were still not on
totally equal footing in the sense that decisions of the boards were appealable to the Court of
Claims. Moreover, the scope of the CDA was limited to contracts, express or implied, for:
"(1) the procurement of property, other than real property in being; (2) the procurement of
services; (3) the procurement of construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real prop-
erty; or, (4) the disposal of personal property." 41 U.S.C. § 602(a). In contrast, the Tucker
Act vested the Court of Claims with jurisdiction over any claim against the United States
founded "upon any express or implied contract with the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1491(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). The CDA also limited the jurisdiction of the federal
district courts under the Little Tucker Act by providing that "the district courts shall not have
jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the United States founded upon any express or
implied contract with the United States ... which [is] subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(l)
of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978." 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2).
Congress specifically provided that:
Each agency board shall have jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision of a
contracting officer (1) relative to a contract made by its agency, and (2) relative to a
contract made by any other agency when such agency or the Administrator has des-
ignated the agency board to decide the appeal. In exercising this jurisdiction, the
agency board is authorized to grant any relief that would be available to a litigant
asserting a contract claim in the United States Claims Court.
41 U.S.C. § 607(d).
69. See ClaINIC & NASH, supra note 61, at 898-99; see also 41 U.S.C. § 605(a) ("All
claims by a contractor against the government relating to a contract shall be in writing and
shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision. All claims by the government
against a contractor relating to a contract shall be the subject of a decision by the contracting
officer.") (emphasis added); Federal Aquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. § 52.233-1 (1992)
("[Disputes arising under or relating to this contract shall be resolved under this clause.")
(emphasis added).
70. See Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1981), aff'd,
230 Ct. CI. 884 (1982).
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E. The Federal Courts Improvement Act
Congress further refined the disputes process by enacting the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982.71 The Act abolished the Court of Claims
and in its place established the United States Claims Court. 72 The Act
placed the Claims Court and boards on largely equal footing in the disputes
process, granting contractors the right to appeal final decisions of con-
tracting officers to either forum, and an additional right of appeal from
either forum to the also newly created United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.73 Thus, today both the boards and the Claims Court
enjoy statutory jurisdiction to hear contractor claims for breach of contract,
including tortious breach of contract, with the Federal Circuit as an addi-
tional arbiter of that jurisdiction.74
F. Election of Remedies: 28 U.S.C. § 1500
Finally, when attempting to choose a forum in which to pursue its claim,
the victim of a tortious breach of contract committed by the government
must be aware of the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1500 and the significant jurisdic-
tional limits they place on claims filed with the Claims Court. Congress
originally enacted § 1500 in 1868. 7- Today, the statute places procedural
limits on the Claims Court's jurisdiction by providing that "[t]he United
States Claims Court shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect
to which the plaintiff.., has pending in any other court any suit... against
the United States or any person who . . . was . . . acting . . . under the
authority of the United States."'76 The purpose of the statute "was to pro-
hibit the filing and prosecution of the same claims against the United States
in two courts at the same time.",77 Thus, the provision requires an election
between a suit filed in the Claims Court and one brought in another court
against the United States or its agent.78
Although judicially-carved exceptions to § 1500 had allowed a plaintiff to
pursue simultaneously a case in the Claims Court and in another forum
when the plaintiff had filed first in the Claims Court,79 the Federal Circuit




75. Act of June 25, 1868, ch. 71, § 8, 15 Stat. 77.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (1988).
77. Frantz Equip. Co. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 579, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1951); see also
Wessel, Duval & Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 636, 637-38 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
78. National Cored Forgings Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 454, 458 (Ct. Cl. 1955)
(citing Matson Navigation Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 352 (1932)).
79. See Tecon Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding that a
plaintiff may not use § 1500 to disrupt the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims), cert. denied,
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recently closed such loopholes by issuing its decision in UNR Industries, Inc.
v. United States.80 In UNR Industries, the court set forth the following
rules:
[I]n accordance with the words, meaning, and intent of section
1500: 1) if the same claim is pending in another court at the time
the complaint is filed in the Claims Court, the Claims Court has no
jurisdiction, regardless of when an objection is raised or acted on;
2) if the same claim is filed in another court after the complaint is
filed in the Claims Court, the Claims Court is by that action
divested of jurisdiction, regardless of when the court memorializes
the fact by order of dismissal; and 3) if the same claim has been
finally disposed of by another court before the complaint is filed in
the Claims Court, ordinary rules of res judicata and available de-
fenses apply.
8 1
Courts have consistently held that contract and tort claims arising out of the
same operative facts are the "same" claim for purposes of § 1500 and thus
fall under its prohibitions.8 2 Consequently, the Claims Court will dismiss a
contract claim when a tort claim is pending that arose from the same facts.
8 3
Finally, an important distinction for the potential plaintiff is that § 1500
does not apply to the boards of contract appeals."4 Thus, a contractor may
file a contract action with a board after unsuccessfully having pursued the
same matter as a tort claim in federal district court.8 5 Moreover, a contrac-
382 U.S. 976 (1966); David Schwartz, Symposium, Section 1500 of the Judicial Code and Du-
plicate Suits Against the Government and Its Agents, 55 GEO. L.J. 573, 596 (1967).
80. 962 F.2d 1013, 1020-22 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub nom., Keene Corp. v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
81. Id. at 1021 (overruling Tecon).
Prior to the Federal Circuit's decision in UNR Industries, when the Claims Court did dis-
miss an action because a claim was pending in district court, the plaintiff was free to refile its
contract claim in the Claims Court if the district court had dismissed the action on jurisdic-
tional grounds, see Connecticut Dep't of Children & Youth Servs. v. United States, 16 C1. Ct.
102, 106 (1989), and if the plaintiff refiled within the statute of limitations, see id.; see also
Winston Bros. v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 130, 134 (D. Minn. 1973) (stating that plaintiff's
filing of an action in the Court of Claims did not toll the statute of limitations in district court).
In light of the UNR Industries decision, however, this opportunity appears to be foreclosed.
See Hardwick Bros. Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 884, 887 (1992) (citing UNR Indus., 962
F.2d at 1021) ("[P]laintiff's prior dismissal of its tort action in the district court did not effect
reestablishment of the Claims Court's jurisdiction.").
82. See, e.g., Beauregard Parish Police Jury v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 344 (1989); Johns-
Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1066
(1989); Dwyer v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 565 (1985); British Am. Tobacco Co. v. United
States, 89 Ct. Cl. 438 (1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 627 (1940).
83. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 188 (1989); Beauregard
Parish, 16 Cl. Ct. at 344.
84. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 860 F.2d 409, 412 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 412, 414-15. In Fort Vancouver, the plaintiff, Fort Vancouver, entered into a
contract with the government for the purchase of timber. Id. at 410. After Fort Vancouver
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tor may file actions concurrently before a federal district court and a board,
although the board may suspend the contract claim pending the outcome of
the tort claim.8 6
had felled and bucked the timber, but before Fort Vancouver had scaled and paid for it, the
Forest Service started a slash burning fire which accidentally destroyed the timber. Id. Fort
Vancouver filed claims concurrently under the CDA and FTCA, the denial of which Fort
Vancouver appealed to the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals and United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington, respectively. Id. at 411. "In view of the FITCA
claim, the Board dismissed the appeal without prejudice subject to reinstatement by either
party within three years. Id. The district court litigation was ultimately unsuccessful because
Fort Vancouver had never gained title to the timber and therefore had no interest protected by
law. Id. (citing Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1984),
later proceeding, 804 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Fort Vancouver subsequently sought reinstatement of its appeal before the board. Id. The
government filed a motion to dismiss, which the board granted based on a theory of comity
and judicial efficiency. Id. (citing Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,289,
at 102,650 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 860 F.2d 409 (Fed. Cir.
1988)). Fort Vancouver appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed, stating:
Clearly, the board did not give effect to the decision of the Ninth Circuit, as that
decision rejected a wholly different theory of recovery from the claim which was
before the board. Fort Vancouver's appeal based in contract cannot justly or ration-
ally be disposed of by giving effect to a decision denying relief in tort. The board
exercised appropriate comity when it deferred consideration of the contract issue
pending resolution of the tort claim. The facts of this case simply do not afford a
present opportunity to exercise comity....
The judicial efficiency aspect of the policy considerations identified by the board is
also an improper basis for dismissal. Although dismissal of Fort Vancouver's claim
certainly promotes judicial efficiency by reducing the caseload by one case, a claim
otherwise meritorious cannot be dismissed on this basis alone, unless by a tribunal
having certiorari-type jurisdiction, which a BCA is not.
Id. at 412.
The Federal Circuit also rejected the government's argument, raised on appeal, that the
doctrine of election of remedies precluded Fort Vancouver from refiling with the board:
With the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the traditional election
doctrine was relaxed.
In the present case, Fort Vancouver was not presented with a true election of
remedies. The contract and tort claims could not be presented in the same forum.
Therefore, Fort Vancouver did not make an election of remedies, as there was only
one possible course of action to take for each claim. Fort Vancouver was required to
file separate actions seeking recovery in tort and contract due to the jurisdictional
scheme of our court system, and it should not be penalized for the unwieldy organi-
zation Congress has devised for our courts. One of our predecessor courts has held
that the election of remedies doctrine does not justify placing "plaintiff under a
greater handicap simply because of the bifurcated nature of the procedures under
which those contracting with the Government must seek relief."
Id. at 4-15 (quoting Petrofsky v. United States, 488 F.2d 1394, 1405 (Ct. Cl. 1973)) (citations
omitted).
86. While the Federal Circuit did note in Fort Vancouver that the "board exercised appro-
priate comity when it deferred consideration of the contract issue pending resolution of the
tort claim," id. at 412, the issue of whether contract and tort actions may proceed simultane-
ously was not before the court. Indeed, it would appear to be entirely proper for a contractor
to proceed with its breach of contract claim before a board while a related tort claim is pending
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III. EXERCISE OF TORT JURISDICTION BY THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS OVER CLAIMS INVOLVING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
A. Tort Jurisdiction
Since the enactment of the FTCA in 1946, courts have examined at least
two related factors in asserting tort jurisdiction over claims involving federal
government contracts. Specifically, courts examine: (1) whether there is no
specific, express clause in the contract governing the alleged conduct; and (2)
whether state law indicates that the conduct constitutes a "classic tort,"
which also may give rise to a cause of action in contract, and thus allows the
plaintiff to elect the cause of action. Reliance on these factors will assist the
contractor in successfully pleading an action in tort.
1. Absence of a Specific Contract Clause
In Nicholson v. United States,87 an early case interpreting the FTCA, the
plaintiff sought damages for the loss of his barn due to a fire. The plaintiff
had entered into a contract for prisoner-of-war labor and alleged that the fire
in federal district court, for under the CDA the contractor has the right "'to a prompt board
of contract appeals consideration of and decision on its claims.' " Todd Shipyards Corp., 88-1
B.C.A. (CCH) 20,509, at 103,682 (1988) (quoting Fidelity Constr. Co., 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) $
14,819 (1980) (citation omitted); see 41 U.S.C. § 607(e) (1988) (providing that "[a]n agency
board shall provide to the fullest extent practicable, informal, expeditious, and inexpensive
resolution of disputes").
In General Dynamics Corp., 92-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,657, at 123,003 (1991), such an issue
was before the board. The appellant concurrently filed a tort claim under the FTCA and a
contract claim under the CDA, alleging professional malpractice (negligent auditing) and
breach of the implied duty of due care under the audit clause, respectively. The board, in
recognizing the appellant's jurisdictional predicament, stated that:
Although the statutory scheme required appellant to seek recovery in tort and alter-
natively under the contract in two separate forums, the existence of the tort claim in
court does not ipsofacto preclude the contract claim before the Board, as argued by
the Government. The harm done may be considered both a breach of an implied
promise under the DIVADS contract and a breach of a duty imposed by law.
Id. at 123,006 (citations and footnote omitted).
The board, however, suspended the breach claim pending the outcome of the tort claim,
stating that:
The right to an expeditious hearing and decision under the Contract Disputes Act is
not absolute. A Board is mandated by the Act to provide "to the fullest extent prac-
ticable, informal, expeditious and inexpensive resolution of disputes." It would be
neither practical, efficient, nor inexpensive to proceed with these appeals. Where the
factors favoring a stay outweigh each party's right to timely resolution, we need not
proceed with the appeal. This situation exists where, as here, issues directly relevant
to the breach claim before the Board are placed before the court.
Id. at 123,007 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 607(d)) (emphasis omitted).
87. 177 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1949).
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resulted from the negligence of the prisoners and their guard.88 In response,
the government filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the
plaintiff was precluded from any recovery under the terms of the contract.89
While the district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the terms of the contract did
not address the type of claim for which the plaintiff was seeking damages.90
The Fifth Circuit, finding no specific contract provision governing the claim,
held that it would be appropriate for the district court to exercise jurisdic-
tion under the FTCA.91
More recently, the Ninth Circuit applied similar reasoning in Walsh v.
United States.92 In Walsh, the plaintiffs sold to the government an easement
for the construction of a highway across the plaintiffs' land, which the plain-
88. Id. at 768.
89. Specifically, the government quoted paragraph seven of the contract, which provided
that:
In case it is found by the Government that the contractor has suffered damages to
his property or property for which he is responsible to a third party, uncompensated
by insurance, arising out of the employment of prisoners of war, and not due to fault
or negligence of the contractor, which are in excess of those normally occasioned by
civil workers, or the same class or classes with like experience at the job, the Govern-
ment (without prejudice to any other rights which the contractor may have) will
allow the amount of such excess damages as a credit against payments otherwise due
from the contractor hereunder; but no such credit shall be taken without the specific
approval of the Government, nor shall the liability of the Government under this
paragraph for any such excess damages exceed the amount of payments due from the
contractor to the Government under the terms of this contract.
Id. at 769 n.2.
90. Id. As the Fifth Circuit further explained:
The invoked contract provision.., is specifically confined to peculiar classes or kinds
of damages, those "which are in excess of those normally occasioned by civil workers
of the same class or classes with like experiences at the job". Even as to these, the
allowance to be made by the government is "without prejudice to any other rights
which the contractor may have". Though, therefore, it is not clear just exactly what
kind of damages paragraph 7 is aiming at, it is quite clear that it has no relation to
and does not affect a tort claim of the kind sued on here.
Id.
91. Id. One year later, in United States v. Scrinopskie, 179 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1950), the
Fifth Circuit again focused on the presence or absence of governing contract language to assess
whether the plaintiff's claim was actionable in tort. In Scrinopskie, the plaintiff had purchased
used welding machines from the government. Id. at 959. The claim alleged that the machines
were damaged during transport due to the government's negligent failure to fasten the ma-
chines during loading. Id. at 960. The court reasoned that:
Even though whatever duty the United States owed to the Plaintiffs in this case arose
out of a contract . . . nevertheless, counsel for the Government conceded in oral
argument that since the breach was of an implied obligation, as distinguished from
the breach of a specific promise in the contract, the Court had jurisdiction under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 960.
92. 672 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1982).
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tiffs used for grazing cattle.93 In their FTCA action, the plaintiffs alleged
that the government negligently failed to maintain the cattle guards con-
structed along the highway, resulting in the loss of plaintiffs' livestock.94
The government filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted,
contending that the plaintiffs based their complaint on contract theory, and
that the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction.95 However, on appeal,
the Ninth Circuit reversed, again focusing on the language of the contract.
96
The Ninth Circuit noted that the terms of the conveyance did not expressly
place a duty of repair on the state and that in any event the language of the
conveyance did not change the state's common law tort duty to repair the
cattle guards.97 Thus, when an examination of the contract terms reveals
the absence of a specific, express contractual duty, an action will lie in tort.98
2. State Law Recognizes Conduct as a "Classic Tort"
An action in tort also will lie when applicable state law recognizes the
alleged conduct as a "classic tort." For example, in New England Helicopter
Service, Inc. v. United States,99 the plaintiff entered into a contract to rent a
helicopter to the government.' °° Shortly thereafter, the helicopter crashed
while being operated by a government employee.' 0 ' As a result of the crash,
the plaintiff was forced to perform extensive repairs to the helicopter and to
forego additional rental opportunities while performing those repairs.'
0 2
Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a claim for $15,000 under the FTCA for the
cost of repairs and loss of use and profit. 103 The United States moved to
93. Id. at 747.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 749-50. Specifically, the court reasoned that:
[T]he terms of the conveyance do not unambiguously place a duty of repair upon the
grantee of the easement. The language may as easily be construed as assuring only
the privilege of going upon the easement to repair and maintain it. It is also obvious
that the language of the conveyance does not add to, detract from or change in any
way the common law privilege and duty of the owner of the easement to repair and
maintain it, a duty which arises ex delicto and which exists if the deed of conveyance
is wholly silent on the subject.
Id.
97. Id.
98. See also Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 547, 552 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that the contract in question did not specifically provide for liabiity under the
circumstances presented); Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. La. 1971)
(holding that action sounded in tort where no specific contract adjustment provision addressed
claims of the nature asserted).
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dismiss, contending that the court could not hear a contract case in which
the claim exceeded $10,000."14 The court looked to common law to assess
whether a cause of action would lie in tort and, recognizing that the action
alleged a bailment, applied the general rule that, in a mutual benefit bail-
ment, the bailor may sue in tort or contract.l°5 The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that a different rule should apply in suits against the
government, i.e., that because the Tucker Act provides relief in actions for
breach of contracts of bailment, no alternative tort remedy should be al-
lowed.' O6 In so ruling, the court reasoned that the United States is to be
treated as a private person under the FTCA and that nothing in the Act
limits the liability of the United States in tort simply because the United
States may also be guilty of a breach of contract.
107
In Martin v. United States,108 the Ninth Circuit again relied on the "clas-
sic tort" theme to assert jurisdiction. Martin involved a claim for damages
resulting from personal injury due to the negligent repair of a house." The
court, however, focused not only on the duty breached, but also on the na-
ture of the injury suffered and damages sought." 0 The Ninth Circuit appar-
104. Id. at 938-39.
105. Id. at 939. Specifically, the court noted that:
It is the general rule that where a bailee for mutual benefit fails to exercise proper
care of the property bailed and it is damaged thereby, the bailor may sue him in
assumpsit or in an action on the case. The bailor has this election of remedies be-
cause the bailee's violation of the duty imposed upon him by the bailment is not only
a breach of his contract but also a tort.
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. The Third Circuit employed similar reasoning in Aleutco Corp. v. United States,
244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1957), where the plaintiff filed an F'CA claim for conversion. Id. at
675. In Aleutco, the court recognized that although Aleutco could have filed a complaint for
breach of contract in the Court of Claims, "there is no policy in the law which requires that
the forum of the district court be denied a plaintiff who pleads and proves a classic case in
tort." Id. at 679. A federal district court arrived at a similar conclusion in Palomo v. United
States, 188 F. Supp. 633 (D. Guam 1960), where the court concluded that: (1) the plaintiff's
claim for waste could be asserted as a tort or a breach of contract under state law; (2) the
United States is liable under the FTCA if a private person would be liable under state law; (3)
therefore, the plaintiff could maintain the action in tort or contract against the United States.
Id. at 637.
108. 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 705. As the court noted:
The tort alleged here arises from an unsafe condition leading to a personal injury. It
is a classic tort. If the claim arising out of the breach of contract were for expecta-
tion damages, i.e., asking for the installation of a good spout, it would be more char-
acteristic of a contractual action. However, this is a personal injury action arising
from breach of a duty of care arising out of a contract. It would be improper to limit
the plaintiff to a purely contract remedy.
Id.; see also Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the district
court had jurisdiction over a claim by borrowers against the government for liquidation of
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ently relied heavily on the fact that the plaintiff had not sought contractual
expectation damages such as "loss of profit or other purely economic
harm."'' Thus, where the plaintiff alleges a classic tort and seeks corre-
sponding tort damages the federal district courts will assert jurisdiction
under the FTCA.
B No Tort Jurisdiction
Federal courts will assert FTCA jurisdiction where the contract does not
address the specific conduct or injury at issue or where the conduct or injury
constitutes a classic tort. As one might expect, the converse applies as well.
Federal district courts will not exercise jurisdiction under the FTCA where
the activity at issue: (1) is governed by the terms of the contract; and/or (2)
does not give rise to an action in tort under state law. In addition to examin-
ing these issues, courts, when finding that no tort jurisdiction exists, have
sought to advance a government-contract-specific policy goal, namely, the
maintenance of a uniform body of federal law governing federal government
contracts.
1. Failure to Plead an Actionable State Law Tort
In Aktiebolaget Bofors v. United States,'12 an early FTCA case, the plain-
tiff granted a license to the United States for the use of a secret manufactur-
ing process for an anti-aircraft gun.' 13 The claim alleged that the United
States improperly furnished the gun to its allies, constituting "an illegal use
of the secret process in excess of the limitation of the license." '114 The court
easily dismissed the claim by relying on the well-recognized rule established
by the Restatement of Torts that it is the improper procurement of the trade
secret, rather than the mere use of that secret, that gives rise to an action in
tort. 1 5 There was simply no basis in state law for finding that the com-
plained-of activity constituted a tort.
Similar results are found in Wooldridge Manufacturing Co. v. United
States, "6 in which the plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder on a government
contract, alleged that the contracting officer "negligently, tortiously and ille-
cattle under a security agreement where such conduct constituted a conversion under state
law); Green Constr. Co. v. Williams Form Eng'g Corp., 506 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(holding that the district court had jurisdiction over a claim for indemnity where applicable
law provided that tort liability may arise out of negligent performance or nonperformance of a
contract).
111. Martin, 649 F.2d at 705.
112. 93 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
113. Id. at 132.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 133 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939)).
116. 235 F.2d 513 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per curiam).
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gaily entered into the contract with Caterpillar [plaintiff's competitor].""' 7
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, state law simply did not recognize any tort
action governing the specific wrong at issue, and thus the court dismissed the
case."' More recently in Nichols v. Block," 9 the court dismissed the plain-
tiff's tort claim, which was premised on violations of federal statutes and
regulations relating to loans administered by the Farmers Home Adminis-
tration (FmHA), because the plaintiff "fail[ed] to point to the existence of a
specific duty under Montana law analogous to the obligation imposed upon
the FmHA by the statutes and regulations at issue.' ' 20 Thus, the absence of
a tort under applicable state law will prove fatal to the plaintiff's claim
under the FTCA.
2. Breach of a Promise Made in a Contract
Where the alleged conduct is primarily a breach of a contractual under-
taking, i.e., a specific promise made in a contract, the plaintiff's claim under
the FTCA also will fail for want of jurisdiction. In Woodbury v. United
States,1 21 the Ninth Circuit addressed the plaintiff's action under the FTCA
for breach of fiduciary duty by the Housing and Home Finance Agency
(HHFA). The plaintiff obtained financing from the HHFA for the construc-
tion of prefabricated housing for naval and civilian personnel at Kodiak Na-
val Base in Alaska. 22 The loan was insured by the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA). 123 The plaintiff met with financial difficulties, which brought con-
struction to a halt. 24 After much negotiation, the parties reached an agree-
ment providing for the completion of the project and the payment of
creditors.1 25 Upon completion, 341 of 343 units passed FHA require-
117. Id. at 514.
118. More specifically, the D.C. Circuit stated:
One of the essential elements of a cause of action in negligence is that the conduct
complained of invaded some interest of the plaintiff which, by virtue either of statute
or of the common law, is entitled to protection as against the defendant. Otherwise
expressed, the rule is that the plaintiff must allege facts which show that the defend-
ant breached some legally imposed duty owed to the plaintiff. The Federal Tort
Claims Act provides that the Government shall be liable under circumstances where
it, if a private person, would be liable. We think the complaint in the case at bar did
not allege facts constituting a tort, because it failed to show that any legally protected
right belonging to the plaintiff was invaded.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. 656 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Mont. 1987).
120. Id. at 1445.
121. 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963).
122. Id. at 292.
123. Id. at 293.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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ments. 126 However, the HHFA filed a foreclosure action against the plain-
tiff's company in district court alleging: (1) that the company still owed
outstanding advances of over $4 million and accrued interest of $211,105.65;
(2) that FHA and FNMA commitments to insure had lapsed; and (3) that
no permanent individual mortgages had been taken out on any of the 341
units. 127
Subsequently, Woodbury filed its action under the FTCA and alleged that
the HHFA breached its fiduciary relationship with Woodbury by refusing to
adopt a "financing plan that considered the claims of all the parties inter-
ested in the completion agreement and instead by proceeding to satisfy and
prefer its own interests as a creditor from the assets of the project to the
exclusion of the interests of said other persons." 2 ' In analyzing the claim,
the Ninth Circuit focused on the source of the promise or duty allegedly
breached:
Many breaches of contract can also be treated as torts. But in
cases such as this, where the "tort" complained of is based entirely
upon breach by the government of a promise made by it in a con-
tract, so that the claim is in substance a breach of contract claim,
and only incidentally and conceptually also a tort claim, we do not
think that the common law or local state law right to "waive the
breach and sue in tort" brings the case within the Federal Tort
Claims Act.129
Since the Ninth Circuit's decision in Woodbury, a steady stream of cases
have held that the federal district courts do not have jurisdiction under the
FTCA over claims based on the government's alleged failure to perform es-
sentially contractual obligations.' 3o
126. Id. (explaining that the remaining two units were not acceptable to the FHA due to
problems with the foundation).
127. Id. at 294; see also United States v. Aleutian Homes, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 571 (D.
Alaska 1961) (providing an account of the HHFA's foreclosure action against Aleutian Homes
which was organized by Woodbury).
128. Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 294 (quoting Woodbury v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 924,
933 (D. Or. 1961)).
129. Id. at 295. The court continued:
We do not mean that no action will ever lie against the United States under the
Tort Claims Act if a suit could be maintained for a breach of contract based upon the
same facts. We only hold that where, as in this case, the action is essentially for
breach of a contractual undertaking, and the liability, if any, depends wholly upon
the government's alleged promise, the action must be under the Tucker Act, and
cannot be under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Id. at 296.
130. See, e.g., Eddleman v. United States, 729 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D. Mont. 1989) (holding
that a claim for failure to transfer title to horses or compensate plaintiffs for feeding them was
not a tort); Darko v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 223, 228 (D. Mont. 1986) (concluding that a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty for failure to approve lease did not sound in tort); Blanchard
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3. Uniform Body of Federal Government Contract Law
While Woodbury and its progeny have focused primarily on the source of
the obligation allegedly breached in order to determine whether the action
sounds in tort, these courts have also been motivated by a desire to maintain
a uniform body of federal law governing federal government contracts.
In Woodbury, the Ninth Circuit explained the statutory scheme of the
FTCA and the Tucker Act as applied to tort claims and contract claims
against the federal government. 31 In so doing, the court made a distinction
as to the applicable law under each statute.13 2 The court stated that "the
law to be applied in construing or applying provisions of government con-
tracts is federal, not state law."'133 On the other hand, under the FTCA,
"state law, not federal law, controls."134
In holding against the exercise of jurisdiction, the court concluded that:
The notion of such waiver of breach and suit in tort is a product of
the history of English forms of action; it should not defeat the long
established policy that government contracts are to be given a uni-
form interpretation and appliction under federal law, rather than
being given different interpretations and applications depending
upon the vagaries of the laws of fifty different states.'
3 5
v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 341 F.2d 351, 357 (5th Cir.) (concluding that a contractor's
claim for wrongful termination did not sound in tort since the sole relationship between the
parties was wholly contractual in character), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); Herder Truck
Lines v. United States, 335 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1964) (finding that the claim for conversion was
actually a claim for breach of bill of lading). While the focus in such cases is generally on the
type of activity prescribed or prohibited, at least two cases analyzed the injury flowing from
the activity to determine whether an exclusively contractual obligation has been breached. In
Petersburg Borough v. United States, 839 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1988), the court noted that the
claim was "for breach of a promise by the [Farmers Home] Administration to close timely, a
default leading to purely economic harm. No person suffered any personal injury... nor was
property damaged." Id. at 163. In Helena Joint City-County Airport Bd. v. United States,
256 F. Supp. 792 (D. Mont. 1966), a contract clause specifically covered "damage to runways,
taxiways or other facilities." Thus, the court concluded that a claim alleging damage to these
areas did not sound in tort, but rather arose out of contractual obligations. Id. at 793. But see
infra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the presence of a specific contractual obligation does not appear to be
dispositive of jurisdiction where state law gives rise to a separate tort duty)).
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For the Ninth Circuit, there was no other tenable result.' 36 Thus, the main-
tenance of a uniform body of federal procurement law is an important policy
consideration for the potential plaintiff under the FTCA. '7
IV. EXERCISE OF CONTRACT JURISDICTION BY THE CLAIMS COURT
OVER TORTIOUS BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS
A. Contract Jurisdiction
Unfortunately for the plaintiff whose tort claim is dismissed by a federal
district court for lack of jurisdiction, that dismissal is not the equivalent of a
finding that the Claims Court does have jurisdiction.' Rather, the Claims
Court will perform its own independent analysis of the claim in light of the
statutes granting it jurisdiction over contract claims. l3 9 More specifically,
the Claims Court will exercise jurisdiction when it determines that a tortious
breach of contract has occurred, i.e., that the wrong alleged is actually de-
rived from the government's contractual undertaking and thus is not a tort
independent of the contract. "°
In the frequently cited case of Chain Belt Co. v. United States,'4' the
Court of Claims set forth the analysis for determining whether a plaintiff's
claim sounds in contract. In Chain Belt, the plaintiff entered into a contract
for the purchase of a manufacturing plant from the government.142 At the
time of the purchase, there were machines still affixed to the realty which
were not included in the sale. 4a Consequently, the contract contained a
clause granting the government access to the premises for purposes of selling
and removing the machinery. 44
After much delay, the government finally contracted with a moving com-
pany for the removal of the machinery. 14  After the removal began, the
plaintiff noted that the manner in which the company was removing the
machinery caused excessive damage to the factory flooring.' 46 After re-
peated and unsuccessful complaints, negotiations, and administrative claims,
136. Id. ("[T]o permit the result here sought would give to the plaintiff not only a choice
of forum (district court rather than Court of Claims where over $10,000 is sought), but also a
choice of law.").
137. But see infra note 234 and accompanying text (noting that the goal of uniformity does
not appear to be dispositive of jurisdiction).
138. See Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 233, 237 (1990).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 115 F. Supp. 701 (Ct. Cl. 1953).
142. Id. at 705.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 705-06.
146. Id. at 706.
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the plaintiff filed an action in the Court of Claims for the damage caused to
the floor. 1
47
The government contended, inter alia, that the plaintiff's claim was be-
yond the court's jurisdiction because it sounded in tort. 4 ' In response, the
court noted that "an action may be maintained in this court which arises
primarily from a contractual undertaking regardless of the fact that the loss
resulted from the negligent manner in which defendant performed its con-
tract."' 49 The court further explained that a tortious breach of contract
does not constitute an independent tort that precludes filing suit under the
Tucker Act.'5° The court thus concluded that the allegedly wrongful con-
duct was a result of the Government's contractual duty to use ordinary care
in the removal of the machinery from the factory. 5 '
The Court of Claims consistently relied on its analysis in Chain Belt
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.' 52 In 1980, the Supreme Court, while not
specifically citing Chain Belt, applied similar reasoning in the context of an
implied-in-fact contract. 5 3 As the Court stated:
Without more, neither the existence of a tort remedy nor the lack
of one is relevant to determining whether there is an implied-in-
fact contract of bailment upon which the United States is liable in
the Court of Claims pursuant to its waiver of sovereign immunity
contained in the Tucker Act.
1 54
Since their inception, both the Federal Circuit and Claims Court have con-
sistently recognized that the existence of a tort is not relevant to whether
there is a contract claim; rather, the only relevant inquiry is whether there
was a breach of a primarily contractual undertaking. 55 Finally, in its most
147. Id. at 706-07.
148. Id. at 711-12.
149. Id. at 711-12 (citing Chippewa Indians v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 97, 130, 131
(1940)).
150. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2401, 2402 (1988); United States v. Huff, 165 F.2d 720,
723 (5th Cir. 1948)).
151. Id.
152. A progression of cases reaffirm the decision in Chain Belt. See Bird & Sons v. United
States, 420 F.2d 1051, 1054 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (stating that "where an alleged 'negligent' act con-
stitutes a breach of a contractually created duty, the Tucker Act does not preclude relief");
Burtt v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 310, 314 (1966); see also Fountain v. United States, 427
F.2d 759 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (citing Burt, 176 Ct. Cl. at 314, for the proposition that "[i]f contrac-
tual relations exist, the fact the alleged breach is also tortious does not foreclose Tucker Act
jurisdiction"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 839 (1971).
153. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980).
154. Id. at 466.
155. See, e.g., San Carlos Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. United States, 877 F.2d 957, 960
(Fed. Cir. 1989); H.H.O., Inc. v. United States, 7 C1. Ct. 703, 706-07 (1985); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 142, 146, 149-50 (1988); Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441,
453 (1984).
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recent decisions, the Claims Court has spoken in terms of finding a "direct
connection" or "nexus" between the contractual obligations and tortious
conduct in order to conclude that a claim establishes a tortious breach of
contract. 1
56
B. No Contract Jurisdiction
An analysis of decisions issued by the Court of Claims, Claims Court, and
Federal Circuit, holding that no contract jurisdiction exists over contract
claims that also involve tortious conduct, reveals the courts' general failure
to provide any detailed analysis. Instead, the decisions merely set forth,
either explicitly or implicitly, a simple, conclusory syllogism: (1) the court
does not have jurisdiction over tort claims; (2) the plaintiff's claim alleges a
tort; and (3) therefore, the court has no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
claim.' 57 This appears to be due to the fact that in most cases it is obvious,
156. See Summit Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 54, 57 (1990) (finding a
sufficient nexus between the alleged tort and the parties' contractual obligations for the claim
to come within the Tucker Act), summary judgment granted on other grounds, 23 Cl. Ct. 333
(1991); Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc. v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 233, 237 (1990) (reaffirming the
need for a close connection between contract provisions and the alleged tortious conduct in
order for the Court of Claims to exercise jurisdiction); Hartle v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 479,
483 (1989) (stating that "there appears to be a direct connection between HUD's contractual
obligations and the alleged tortious conduct"), complaint dismissed on other grounds, 22 Cl.
Ct. 843 (1991).
157. See, e.g., Smithson v. United States, 847 F.2d 791, 794 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1004 (1989); Radioptics, Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 1113, 1130 (Ct. Cl. 1980);
Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241, 1249 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Fort Sill Gardens, Inc.
v. United States, 355 F.2d 636, 637-38 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
The Claims Court provided a somewhat more extensive analysis in C.B.C. Enters. v. United
States, 24 Cl. Ct. 1 (1991), where the plaintiff alleged that the government's unwarranted in-
vestigation and unfair recommendation for disbarment constituted a breach of the govern-
ment's "duty to act in good faith and deal fairly, to cooperate and not to hinder, to evaluate
claims for equitable adjustment fairly, to administer the contract with due care, and to not
actively interfere." Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted). In concluding that the claim sounded in tort
and was independent of the contract, the court stated:
The contract duties which plaintiff claims were breached are not express but im-
plicit in any contract. But such generalized obligations as, not interfering with the
other party's performance, or failure to act in good faith, must have a contract per-
formance referent to have any relevance. While obviously having more force than
mere precatory language, good conduct obligations are not self enforcing. A genera-
lized pattern of obnoxious behavior may have some bearing on whether one party's
discretionary assessment of the other's performance is entitled to deference. Or a
party claiming hindrance for example, might allege some result of that hindrance in
contract terms, for instance, that non-performance should be excused, or that delays
resulted. But here there is simply no nexus alleged between the Government's alleg-
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at least to the court, that the complaint alleges a tort and not a breach of
contract. 1
58
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of Claims Court decisions that deny
jurisdiction is the court's occasional focus on the type of damages sought in
order to determine whether the action lies primarily in tort or in contract.' 59
For example, in Olin Jones Sand Co. v. United States,1" the plaintiff alleged
that the government had improperly delayed making payments under a con-
tract, resulting in the inability of the plaintiff to make payments to employ-
ees, subcontractors, and suppliers.161 The plaintiff further alleged that the
government had made false statements to the plaintiff's bonding company,
impairing the plaintiff's ability to obtain bonding on future contracts.
162
The plaintiff sought $500,000 in consequential and resulting damages.
1 63
In ruling on the government's motion for summary judgment, the court
first turned to the question of allowable contract damages. 164 The court
noted that while it may allow direct or foreseeable damages, it only may
allow consequential damages when they are the natural and probable conse-
quence of a breach and not when they are remote and speculative.165 The
court then turned to the jurisdictional issue and chose to exercise jurisdiction
158. See Radioptics, 621 F.2d at 1130 (dismissing a claim of misappropriation of a trade
secret because it constituted a tort); Algonac, 428 F.2d at 1249 (dismissing a claim because the
allegations constituted wrongful prosecution, libel, defamation, and institution of wrongful
civil proceedings); Williamson v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 239, 244-45 (1964) (dismissing a
claim alleging that government security officials released derogatory information to the plain-
tiff's employer without the plaintiff's permission, resulting in termination of employment, be-
cause these allegations constituted a claim for interference with a contract). However, at times
the courts have been somewhat vague and less obvious in identifying what the tort is. See, e.g.,
Pinkston v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 263, 265, 267 (1984) (dismissing a claim alleging that the
government's extensive, investigation was an unlawful interference with business resulting in
"'constructive, unlawful suspension, debarment [sic] or blacklisting,' " because the plaintiff
asserted jurisdiction under a tort theory previously not recognized by the Court); Somali Dev.
Bank v. United States, 508 F.2d 817, 820 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (holding that, even though the court
"had difficulty in analyzing plaintiffs' legal arguments ... [it] concluded that.., their cause of
action sound[ed], in substance and in reality, in tort").
159. See Frawley v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 766, 767 (1988) ("Plaintiff is reminded that a
claim for damage to reputation is a claim sounding in tort over which this court has no juris-
diction."); Manak v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 783, 786 (1980) ("[D]amages claimed ... are
clearly special damages recoverable only under a tort claim for relief."); Transcountry Packing
Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 1333, 1338 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (stating that "the very nature of...
damages claimed by plaintiff . . . clearly reflects that plaintiff's petition is in tort"). In the
above-cited cases, however, the type of damages sought appears to be merely an indication of
the type of claim alleged and ultimately not dispositive of the issue.
160. 225 Ct. Cl. 741 (1980).
161. Id. at 742.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 742-43.
165. Id. at 743-44.
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over the alleged breach, but carefully limited the scope of recovery to allowa-
ble contract damages.
166
Thus, the Claims Court will focus on whether the breach is of a primarily
contractual undertaking in making its jurisdictional determination. In addi-
tion, the court will look at the type of damages sought as further evidence of
the type of claim alleged.
V. EXERCISE OF CONTRACT JURISDICTION BY THE BOARDS OF
CONTRACT APPEALS OVER TORTIOUS BREACH OF CONTRACT
CLAIMS
A. Contract Jurisdiction
Predictably, because the CDA "authorized" the boards of contract ap-
peals "to grant any relief that would be available . . . in the . . .Claims
Court,"' 67 the boards very closely follow the analysis set forth in Claims
Court precedent when asserting jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim
that also involves tortious conduct. This analysis typically includes an ex-
amination of whether the claim alleges a breach that is primarily of a con-
tractual undertaking. Focusing on the language of the actual jurisdictional
grant of the CDA, however, the boards often pose the issue of jurisdiction as
a question of whether the appeal alleges a violation "relative to a con-
tract."'16 8 Finally, at least one board has looked to the Uniform Commercial
166. More specifically, the court stated:
Insofar as plaintiff's references to defendant's alleged misrepresentations are merely
another way of asserting that a breach of contract occurred, the sixth claim is not
barred simply because it might also be stated as a tort. However, damages arising
from defendant's alleged breach must still be limited to compensation for those inju-
ries directly related to completion of the contract in question, as opposed to any
remote or speculative effects the misrepresentations might have had on obtaining
bonding for other contracts. The damages must be proper contract damages.
Id. at 745; see also C.B.C. Enters. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 1 (1991). Looking to the type of
damages sought, the court noted:
The non-contractual nature of the claim is further highlighted by the type of dam-
ages sought. Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees and internal expenses
for defending itself against the criminal investigation and possible debarment. Coun-
sel fees and other litigation expenses are not recoverable as breach of contract dam-
ages absent a specific authorization.
Id. at 5.
Finally, the Claims Court has held that punitive damages are not available in contract ac-
tions. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 204 (1988), where the court dismissed the
plaintiff's punitive damages claim for bad faith and false representation, because "[c]laims
sounding in tort are beyond this court's jurisdiction. A fortiori, this court is without jurisdic-
tion to award punitive damages." Id. at 208 (citations omitted).
167. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1988).
168. Id.
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Code (UCC) for guidance in its determination of whether a contractual obli-
gation exists.169
1. Following Claims Court Precedent
In Goodfellow Bros. ,7o the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals was
confronted with a lessor's claim that alleged, inter alia, that the government
had damaged the leased property, a camp, by negligently allowing the water
system to freeze. The board began its analysis by questioning whether it had
jurisdiction over the type of legal issue presented and relief sought. 1 The
board then observed that under the CDA,' 7 2 it had subject-matter jurisdic-
tion equivalent to that of the Court of Claims, and that tort claims are ex-
pressly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under the
Tucker Act.'73
However, the Board then recognized that in certain situations the Court
of Claims exercises jurisdiction over contract claims that also involve tor-
tious conduct.' 74 The Board then noted that the Court of Claims had specif-
ically held that the court had jurisdiction over a breach of an express
covenant in a lease "to restore the premises to the condition that existed
when the lease was executed."' 75 Finally, the Board examined the contract
terms and, finding a clause that required the government to leave the prem-
ises in good repair, asserted jurisdiction over the claim.'7 6 Thus, because a
board's jurisdiction is largely equivalent to that of the Claims Court, a board
169. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
170. 81-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,917, at 73,798 (1981).
171. Id. at 73,805.
172. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988).
174. Goodfellow, 81-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 73,805 (citing Fountain v. United States, 427 F.2d
759 (Ct. Cl. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 839 (1971); Fort Sill Gardens, Inc. v. United States,
355 F.2d 636 (Ct. C1. 1966); Olin Jones Sand Co. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 741 (1980);
Burtt v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 310 (1966)). As the Goodfellow court noted:
Although the Court has recognized that it lacks jurisdiction of tort claims, it has
also recognized that an action could be maintained which arises primarily from a
contractual undertaking even though the loss may have resulted from the negligent
manner in which the contract was performed. Similarly the Court has held that
while a party may not bring a tort claim within the jurisdiction of the Court by
framing it in terms of an implied contract, an action for breach of an enforceable
contract is not outside the Court's jurisdiction simply because elements of tort are
present in the claim.
Goodfellow, 81-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 73,805 (citation omitted).
175. Id. (citing San Nicolas v. United States, 617 F.2d 246 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
176. Id. A board employed similar reasoning in Kolar, Inc., 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,044,
at 84,854 (1983); see also Marangos Constr. Corp., 90-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,309, at 112,027,
112,028 (1989) (holding that the board has jurisdiction to hear a claim alleging a breach of an
implied contractual obligation in order to protect jobsite materials that were destroyed by fire).
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will examine the contract in order to determine, in the vernacular of the
Claims Court, whether the breach is of a primarily contractual undertaking.
2. Looking to Claims Relating to a Contract
In addition to following Claims Court precedent, the boards often focus
on whether the allegations "relate to" the contract in dispute, because the
language in the CDA that specifically grants jurisdiction is phrased in terms
of "jurisdiction to decide any appeal . . . relative to a contract.""' For
example, in Jones, Inc., 178 the appellant filed a claim alleging that its
gearbox, which appellant used to store equipment and material for a con-
struction project, was missing from the storage space assigned by the govern-
ment. The contracting officer denied the claim, stating that the contractor
failed to store the gearbox in the designated storage area, and thus the gov-
ernment could not be held liable for its disappearance. 7 9
On appeal, the government filed a motion to dismiss, which the board
denied. 80 The government renewed its motion, however, asserting three re-
lated arguments: (1) "Appellant has not presented a claim arising under the
contract but rather generally sought refuge in tort principles for his claim;"
(2) "no relevant contract provision has come to light shifting to the Govern-
ment the burden of protecting or preserving Appellant's property;" and (3)
"as a general proposition, Boards of Contract Appeals may not exercise ju-
risdiction in matters sounding in tort."'' The board then examined its ju-
risdiction under the CDA in light of the government's arguments, and
concluded that the board had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dis-
pute where the claim related to the contract and was predicated on the CDA
rather than on general tort law. 18 2 The board then concluded that the terms
of the agreement were in dispute and consequently constituted matters relat-
177. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (1988).
178. 84-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 17,608, at 87,723 (1984).
179. Id. at 87,725. The contractor denied the contracting officer's finding, asserting that it
did place the gearbox in the designated area, from which it was subsequently stolen. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 87,725-26.
182. Id. at 87,726.
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ing to the contract. 8 3 Accordingly, the board denied the government's mo-
tion to dismiss.
1 8 4
More recently, in Liquid Carbonic,"5 the board addressed a claim for
"loss of use" of medical gas cylinders that were furnished to the government
under a blanket purchase agreement ("BPA"), but were not returned to the
contractor. The government filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the
appellant's original claim had no basis under the BPA provisions and
sounded in tort over which the board had no jurisdiction."8 6 In response,
the board focused on its grant of jurisdiction by the CDA over any express
or implied contract and concluded that the absence of an express contractual
obligation would not defeat that jurisdiction.
8 7
183. Id. Although the board chose to exercise jurisdiction, it could not find for the con-
tractor. See id.
A similar statement of the law is found in Marangos Constr. Corp., 90-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
22,309, at 112,027 (1989), where the appellant entered into a contract with the government to
perform roof repairs. The appellant stored roofing construction materials at the worksite in
accordance with the contract's "Operations and Storage Areas" clause. Id. When a fire de-
stroyed the materials, the appellant filed a claim for, inter alia, the replacement of the materi-
als. Id. On appeal to the board, the government filed a motion to dismiss, which the board
denied on the ground that while the government correctly stated the law, it mischaracterized
the claim:
The Government argues that this appeal sounds in tort and "any alleged wrongs by
the Government are independent of the contractual obligations of the parties." The
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), does not confer upon the Board jurisdiction
over disputes sounding in tort. Further in Alfred Bronder, the Board stated that:
"[i]n order for a purported 'tort' claim to be cognizable under the Act, it must relate
to or arise out of an express or implied contractual obligation."
The Government, however, mischaracterizes appellant's claim. In the 11 March
1988 claim, appellant alleged, among other things, that the Government breached an
implied contractual obligation to protect the materials, failed to make payments
under the PAYMENTS TO CONTRACTORS clause, and directed appellant to
clean up debris from the fire.
This Board has jurisdiction to decide liability for damages and associated costs for
replacing materials when responsibility and liability are to be determined by the con-
tractual obligations of the parties. Appellant's allegations confer jurisdiction of the
Board.
Id. at 112,028 (citations omitted). Thus, the boards will recognize an implied duty to protect a
contractor's materials, a duty that was breached in Marangos but not in Jones.
184. Id.
185. 91-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 24,040, at 120,333 (1991).
186. The government asserted, correctly, that there was "no clause in the BPA requiring
the Government to reimburse appellant for the loss of cylinders." Id. at 120,334.
187. Id. (citing Alfred Bronder, 86-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,102, at 96,554 (1986), aff'd,
Bronder v. United States, 824 F.2d 980 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). The board then examined whether
the evidence supported the existence of such an implied-in-fact obligation:
While appellant contends that a bailment relationship existed between the parties, it
appears to us that it is, in effect, alleging that, as a result of the nature of the contract
performance, in which appellant's cylinders were accepted by the Government filled
with gas and, for the most part, returned empty, there resulted a contract implied in
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Thus, the boards, like the Claims Court, will focus on the presence of an
express or implied contractual obligation. However, the boards will use this
finding to determine whether the claim relates to the contract under the
terms of the CDA, while the Claims Court will use the existence of a con-
tractual obligation to determine whether the breach is primarily of a con-
tractual undertaking. Although the methods differ, the results are the same.
3. Looking to the UCC
Finally, at least one board has looked to the UCC to determine whether
there is a breach of contractual duty which confers jurisdiction. In Noodles
by Leonardo, Inc. ," the Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals was faced
with a claim alleging that the government had caused infestation of the ap-
pellant's pasta, which the government subsequently rejected.'" 9 After quot-
ing extensively from the jurisdictional analysis set forth in Goodfellow,' 90 the
Board focused on the particular contractual obligation allegedly breached by
the government and, in asserting jurisdiction, noted that the UCC would
place a duty of due care on the government in such circumstances.' 9' Thus,
the existence of a contractual duty under the UCC may help to establish
jurisdiction.
fact that the empty cylinders would continue to be returned after Government re-
ceipt. If appellant is to recover on its claim here, it must, among other things, estab-
lish the existence of such an implied contract. We will provide it with the
opportunity to do so and will not dismiss the appeal.
Id.
188. 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,488, at 92,853 (1985).
189. Id. More specifically, the appellant alleged that the government included a shipment
of another producer's infested pasta in the shipment of appellant's pasta, resulting in the infes-
tation of appellant's pasta. Appellant claimed such damages as "infestation of the properly
returned pasta, expenses and lost profits of shutting down Appellant's plant, and fumigation
expenses." Id. at 92,856. The case presents a close and difficult question. Appellant did not
complain that the Government wrongfully rejected the pasta, nor that the Government's rejec-
tion of the pasta caused the alleged damages. Rather, Appellant alleged that the Government
included, in its shipment to the Appellant, infested pasta of another producer, which resulted
in damages to the Appellant. Such damages included infestation of the properly returned
pasta, expenses and lost profits of shutting down Appellant's plant, and fumigation expenses.
Id. at 92,855.
190. 81-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,917, at 73,798 (1981).
191. Noodles, 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) at 92,856. Specifically, the court reasoned that:
While there is no specific contract provision regarding the Government's obligations
with respect to the rejected pasta, such an obligation can be implied as a result of the
bailment relationship that arises. Further, under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
Sections 2-602 and 2-603, the Government owes Appellant a duty to reasonably care
for the rejected goods. Therefore, to the extent that the Government may have
breached this duty through negligence or otherwise by causing infestation of the re-
jected pasta if no infestation was already present, the Board has jurisdiction over that
portion of the appeal relating to the claimed damages to the rejected product.
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B. No Contract Jurisdiction
Historically, the boards of contract appeals summarily dismissed claims
involving tortious conduct because the boards had no authority under the
disputes clause to decide claims for breach of contract, let alone tortious
breach of contract.192 However, because the CDA vests the boards with
authority to grant relief largely equal to that of the Claims Court, board
cases that today deny jurisdiction over claims involving tortious conduct
closely follow Claims Court decisions that also deny such jurisdiction. Us-
ing the language of the Claims Court, these board cases find that the breach,
in the words of the Claims Court, is "independent of the contract,"'' 93 and
likewise question whether, pursuant to the terms of the CDA, the claim "re-
lates to" the contract. 94
192. See supra note 67.
193. More specifically, the boards typically begin their analysis by observing that under the
CDA their jurisdiction is coextensive with that of the Claims Court and that while the Claims
Court does not have jurisdiction over claims asserting torts independent of the contract, it does
have jurisdiction over claims alleging tortious breach of contract. See, e.g., Asfaltos Paname-
nos, S.A., 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,315, at 116,917 (1990); Silangan Manpower Servs., 88-2
B.C.A. (CCH) 20,554, at 103,907 (1988). The boards next assert that in order to determine
whether there has been a tortious breach of contract, they must examine whether there is a
"direct" or "sufficient nexus" between the tortious conduct and obligations under the contract.
Asfaltos, 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH), at 116,919 (citing H.H.O., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 703,
706-07 (1985)); Silangan, 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) at 103,909 (same). The boards then examine the
express and implied terms of the particular contract and find no such nexus, i.e., no controlling
contractual obligation. Asfaltos, 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) at 116,919; Silangan, 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
at 103,909. Of course, sometimes the analysis is wholly implicit. See, e.g., Associated Con-
tract Specialties Corp., 90-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,258, at 116,693 (1990).
194. See, e.g., Alfred Bronder, 86-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 19,102, at 96,554 (1986) (finding no
contract clause or implied obligation governing loss of appellant's shop due to fire), aff'd
mem., Bronder v. United States, 824 F.2d 980 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Jay Rucker, 80-2 B.C.A.
(CCH) 14,513, at 71,533 (1980) (holding that "[iut is clear from the record that there has
been neither an express contract ... for the sale of timber salvage rights . . . [nor] a contract
implied in fact .... Since Appellant's claim for the costs he incurred does not arise relative to
a contract . . .but instead is based on alleged misrepresentation . . .his complaint would
appear to sound in tort"); Harvex Trading Co., 90-2 B.C.A. (CCH) T 22,640, at 113,568 (1990)
(ruling that a claim alleging collusion between government employees and the appellant's com-
petitors did "not concern matters arising under or relating to the subject contracts"), appeal
denied, 92-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 25,027 (1992); EDL Constr., Inc., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,313,
at 102,706 (1987) (alleging interference with business relationships and defamation resulting
from contracting officer's letter to Small Business Administration did not relate to the
contract).
Finally, it is worth noting that like the Claims Court, see supra note 166, the boards have
held that punitive damages are not available under the CDA because actions seeking such
damages sound in tort and thus are actions over which the boards have no jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Land Movers, Inc., 91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,317, at 116,927 (1990), appeal denied, 92-1
B.C.A. (CCH) 24,473 (1991); Daiei Denki Co., 86-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 18,840, at 94,949
(1986).
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VI. TORT AND CONTRACT JURISDICTION OVER SPECIFIC CAUSES OF
ACTION
Having analyzed the various factors that the federal district courts,
Claims Court, and boards examine in determining whether to exercise juris-
diction, this Article will now examine how these forums apply those factors
to a series of commonly alleged causes of action in order to determine
whether they sound in tort, contract or both. These specific causes of action
are: (1) negligence; (2) conversion; and (3) breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing.
A. Negligence Resulting in Damage to or Loss of Property
Perhaps the most common "wrong" that involves both tortious conduct
and breach of contract is simple negligence resulting in damage to or loss of
property. Factually speaking, this is true because the real or personal prop-
erty of the contractor 95 is often involved in federal government contracts. 1
96
Legally speaking, this is true because the prerequisites for tort and contract
jurisdiction are easily established in actions alleging negligent conduct re-
sulting in damage to or loss of property. With respect to the exercise of tort
jurisdiction by the federal district courts, a claim alleging negligence result-
ing in damage to or loss of property universally gives rise to a cause of action
in tort under state law. 197 Moreover, there is almost never a specific
contract adjustment provision governing such claims so as to preclude
jurisdiction. 9
195. See, e.g., Aetna Ins. Co. v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. La. 1971) (involving
a tort claim for loss of equipment used in performance of hydrographic surveys for Army
Corps of Engineers); Palomo v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 633 (D. Guam 1960) (involving a
tort claim for damages to real property leased to government); New England Helicopter Serv.,
Inc. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 938 (D.R.I. 1955) (involving a tort claim for damage to
helicopters rented to the government).
196. It is important to note that the term "federal government contracts" is a generic term
that is subject to differing jurisdictional coverage depending on the specific type of contract.
See supra note 68 (comparing scope of the CDA and the Tucker Act).
197. See, e.g., Fort Vancouver Plywood Co. v. United States, 747 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1984);
Walsh v. United States, 672 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Scrinopskie, 179 F.2d
959 (5th Cir. 1950); Nicholson v. United States, 177 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1949); Aetna Ins. Co.,
327 F. Supp. at 865; New England Helicopter Serv., 132 F. Supp. at 938; see also Martin v.
United States, 649 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (determining that an unsafe condition leading to
personal injury is a classic tort). For additional cases discussing jurisdiction over personal
injury claims in the government contract context, see Ross v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 368
(D.D.C. 1986); Binney v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 351 (D. Or. 1971), aff'd, 460 F.2d 263
(9th Cir. 1972); Cline v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 890 (D. Ariz. 1967), aff'd, 410 F.2d 1337
(9th Cir. 1969); Galbraith v. United States, 296 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1961); Epps v. United States,
187 F. Supp. 584 (E.D.S.C. 1960); Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
198. See supra note 197. But see United States v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 345 F.2d 879
(8th Cir. 1965) (holding that the claim was covered by the disputes clause). Kiewit, however,
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While the federal district courts rarely find that a specific contract clause
governs negligence resulting in damage to or loss of property, the Claims
Court and boards often interpret an express provision of a contract, or infer
the existence of an implied condition of a contract, as governing the negli-
gent conduct.1 99 Perhaps the best example of this resulting overlap between
the federal districts courts, the Claims Court, and the boards, is in the con-
text of a bailment. In such cases, the plaintiff is free to allege an action in tort
or contract. 2 °
has been rejected in light of subsequent Supreme Court precedent. See Aetna, 327 F. Supp. at
866 (quoting Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1051, 1054 (1970) (quoting United
States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 402 (1966))).
In three other cases, the plaintiffs failed to obtain jurisdiction because their negligence
claims for expenses incurred in fighting forest fires did not constitute money damages for in-
jury or loss of property. Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Dep't of the Army, 666 F.2d
444, 446 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982); California v. United States, 307 F.2d 941
(9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963); Oregon ex rel. State Forester v. United
States, 308 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 941 (1963). More recently, the
reasoning that money expended due to the government's negligence does not constitute injury
or loss of property has been applied in the context of environmental testing expenses resulting
from the government's alleged negligence. See Charles Burton Builders, Inc. v. United States,
768 F. Supp. 160 (D. Md. 1991).
199. See, e.g., Bird & Sons, 420 F.2d at 1054 (holding that the government breached a duty
to "return the rented property in as good condition as when received"); Pan Arctic Corp. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 546, 549-50 (1985) (noting that plaintiff's use of the term "negligent"
was meant "simply to describe a lack of ordinary skill, competence and diligence" under the
contract); Chain Belt Co. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 701, 712 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (noting that
the "wrong actually derived from the Government's contractual undertaking to use ordinary
care"); Marangos Constr. Corp., 90-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,309, at 112,028 (1989) (noting that
the "Government breached an implied contractual obligation to protect the materials" burned
in fire); Noodles by Leonardo, Inc., 85-3 B.C.A. (CCH) T 18,488, at 92,856 (1985) (according
to the UCC, the government owes "a duty to reasonably care for the rejected goods"); Good-
fellow Bros., 81-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,917, at 73,805 (1981) (noting that the contract clause
"expressly provides that the Government shall leave the premises in good repair, normal wear
and tear excepted"). Of course some contracts simply do not contain the requisite provisions,
express or implied, to invoke contract jurisdiction. As the board said in Asfaltos Panamenos:
There is no indication here of an express or implied duty of the Government to
protect appellant's employees' private property from damage caused by Government
equipment not involved in the contract. The damage to the vehicle resulting from
the helicopter backwash arose independently from the provisions or performance of
the subject contract. Appellant has failed to show the necessary nexus between the
requirements of the subject contract and the damages it seeks.
91-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,315, at 116,919 (1990). See also Wieman v. United States, 678 F.2d
207, 212 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (indicating that a claim arising from tortious conduct of government
personnel "was outside the jurisdiction of the Board under the 'disputes' provision of the re-
spective contracts"); Helicopter Services, 80-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,190, at 69,850 (holding that
claim for damage to helicopter was outside disputes clause in contract which specifically allo-
cated damage to helicopter to contractor).
200. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460 (1980) (Tucker Act); Keifer &
Keifer Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939) (Tucker Act); Crouch v. United
States, 31 F.2d 211 (E.D.S.C. 1928) (Tucker Act); Midland Nat'l Bank v. Conlogue, 720 F.
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B. Conversion
Conversion is another example of tortious conduct that also may consti-
tute a breach of contract. While case law is not unanimous on this point, an
examination of state law by the federal district courts, and of implied or
express contractual obligations by the Claims Court and boards, typically
results in the exercise of jurisdiction by all of these forums.
In order to determine whether to exercise jurisdiction under the FTCA,
federal district courts examining allegations of conversion typically, if not
universally, look to state law to determine whether a cause of action sounds
in tort.2 ° 1 For example, in Love v. United States,20 2 the plaintiffs were farm-
ers who brought an action against the United States for conversion as a re-
sult of the government's liquidation of their livestock and farm equipment
pursuant to a security agreement entered into with the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration (FmHA). The Loves alleged that a court order interpreting 7
U.S.C. § 1981a precluded the FmHA from doing so without notice to the
Loves. 0 3 To determine whether this conduct constituted a tort, the court
turned to Montana state law governing conversion. 2' The court then con-
cluded that since the government's actions satisfied the elements of conver-
sion committed by a private party under Montana law, the plaintiffs could
maintain a cause of action against the United States.20 5 The Court was un-
deterred by the fact that a cause of action might also lie in contract.20 6
Supp. 878 (D. Kan. 1989) (FTCA); New England Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. United States, 132
F. Supp. 938 (D.R.I. 1955) (FTCA); Waschke Williams Olds Cadillac, Inc., 87-1 B.C.A.
(CCH) 19,546, at 98,772 (1986) (CDA).
201. See, e.g., Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1989); Cenna v. United
States, 402 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1968); Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674 (3d Cir.
1957). But see Herder Truck Lines v. United States, 335 F.2d 261, 263, (5th Cir. 1964) (con-
cluding, with no analysis of state law, that the claim was "essentially founded upon contract,
the government bills of lading"). In Herder, however, the plaintiff failed to deliver the full
quantity of parts and equipment to the government pursuant to a contract to transport the
parts and equipment. The government withheld the value of the undelivered parts from its
payment to the plaintiff. Herder therefore sued for conversion, alleging that the parts had been
converted or negligently lost by an agent of the government during loading on Herder's trucks.
The court viewed this as a simple breach of the government's duty to pay Herder under their
contract. At no time was Herder the owner of the converted or negligently lost property
(Herder merely transported the property) and consequently no examination of state law was
necessary. Id.
202. 915 F.2d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1989).
203. Id. at 1244-45. The Loves were plaintiffs in a class action in which the FmHA was
enjoined from liquidating assets without giving notice to the members of the plaintiff class. Id.
at 1244. For further information on this class action suit, see Coleman v. Block, 580 F. Supp.
192 (D.N.D. 1983).
204. Love, 915 F.2d at 1245.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1246 ("Here, the Loves' allegations could have been brought as a breach of
contract claim, but they equally support a tort claim for conversion. Although a breach of
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However, the overlap between a tort action alleging conversion and a con-
tract action arising out of the same facts is not unlimited. The boundaries of
each were explored in Cenna v. United States.2°7 In Cenna, the plaintiff
provided the government with certain engineering drawings to correct a
faulty air conditioning system in a new federal building. Despite an oral
agreement between the plaintiff and the government stipulating payment for
the work, the government refused to pay even after it used the plaintiff's
plans to correct its air conditioning system.208 The plaintiff subsequently
filed an action under the FTCA for conversion. 2" The court looked to
Pennsylvania law for the elements of the tort of conversion and found that it
results from either a deliberate taking of the plaintiff's property without the
plaintiff's consent, or with the plaintiff's consent but with the intent to use
the property for another purpose. 210 The court concluded that because the
government had used the plans for the consented to and intended purpose,
the government's actions did not constitute conversion under Pennsylvania
law.2" In the court's view, this result preserved an important "distinction
between contract and tort claims mandated by the Tucker Act and the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act."
2 12
Claims Court and board cases addressing contract claims that also might
be characterized as a conversion confirm the significant, but not unlimited,
overlap between these causes of action. For example, in Summit Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. United States, 213 the government terminated its contract with
Summit Contractors, Inc. (Summit) to cut and remove timber and sold the
timber that Summit had cut but not yet removed.21 4 The government filed a
promise may be involved, the government's liability ... depends in large part on the Loves'
claim of ownership and possession of the property."). Similar results were reached by the
Third Circuit in Aleutco Corp., where it stated:
Aleutco's complaint is a sufficient statment of a cause in tort for conversion, and it
would seem that Aleutco could have equally well made out a complaint for breach of
contract. Aleutco has chosen to prosecute its action on the basis of tort in the Dis-
trict Court. That it failed to avail itself of an action in the Court of Claims is not a
valid jurisdictional objection.
Aleutco Corp. v. United States, 244 F.2d 674, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1957) (footnote omitted).
207. 402 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1968).
208. Id. at 170.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 171.
211. Id.
212. Id. This distinction is consistent with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 228
(1964), which states that "[olne who is authorized to make a particular use of a chattel, and
uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to liability for conversion to another
whose right to control the use of the chattel is thereby seriously violated." Id.
213. 22 Cl. Ct. 54 (1990), summary judgment granted, 23 Cl. Ct. 333 (1991).
214. Id. at 55.
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claim against Summit for Summit's failure to complete the contract. 21 5
Summit counterclaimed alleging, inter alia, that the government's sale of the
timber was a conversion of Summit's property.2 16 In exercising jurisdictibn
over the claim, the court was unpersuaded by the government's characteriza-
tion of Summit's counterclaim of conversion as "a classic tort. ' 2 17 Instead,
the court reasoned that the counterclaim was based on the timber sales con-
tract between Summit and the government, and thus concluded that there
was a sufficient nexus between the conversion claim and the contract to war-
rant proper Tucker Act jurisdiction over Summit's counterclaim. 2 8 Thus,
while the Claims Court and boards will exercise jurisdiction over even "clas-
sic torts" like conversion, they will do so only when the parties can show a
sufficient nexus between the conduct and a contractual obligation.2" 9
C. Breach of the Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing presents another
example of the overlap between tort and contract jurisdiction, and is perhaps
the most dramatic example of the federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction over
what was historically a contractual duty. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing was first clearly articulated in the UCC,2 20 and subsequently incor-
porated into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.221 Historically, recogni-
215. Id. at 56.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 57.
218. Id. (citing Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 142 (1985)). Unfortu-
nately for Summit, while the court held that the contract contained a provision governing title
to the timber, thus establishing a sufficient nexus between the claim and the contract, id. at 58,
under that provision title to the disputed timber still resided with the government. Conse-
quently, "no claim for conversion can ensue." Id.
219. See Silangan Manpower Servs., 88-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,554, at 103,909 (1988) (hold-
ing that appellant's complaint lacked a "required direct nexus" between conduct and contrac-
tual obligation where a more definite statement of the complaint was needed). But see Algonac
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241, 1249 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (holding that federal courts have
no jurisdiction over various tort claims, including conversion).
220. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, The Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.- An Emerg-
ing Concept?, 3 NASi & CIBINiC REPORT 78 at 164-65 (Nov. 1989); see, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203
(1978) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its
performance or enforcement."); U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (defining "good faith" for merchants as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade").
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("Every contract imposes
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforce-
ment."), quoted in Nash & Cibinic, supra note 220, 78. As Nash and Cibinic note:
The comments to this section give considerable additional guidance. Comment a.
notes the UCC definitions and elaborates as follows:
... The phrase "good faith" is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning
varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a
contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency
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tion of federal tort claims asserting breaches of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing has been slow in coming, apparently due to reliance on princi-
ples stated in adverse precedent such as Woodbury v. United States.222 In
Woodbury, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the gov-
ernment had breached its fiduciary duty because the government's breach
was based entirely upon a promise made in contract, and because holding
otherwise would not contribute to the maintenance of a uniform body of
federal government contract law.223 However, the court failed to provide
any analysis of whether the complaint alleged a tort under state law.
The approach set forth in Woodbury was consistently followed within the
Ninth Circuit in cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty as well as breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,224 culminating with the decision in
LaPlant v. United States.225 In LaPlant, the court specifically rejected an
analysis that focused on whether state law would support a tort claim, and
instead emphasized the importance of maintaining a uniform body of federal
government contract law.226 The court reasoned that the invocation of state
law to define the government's contractual obligations would undermine
"[t]he Tucker Act's policy of ensuring uniformity in the interpretation and
application of the obligations attaching to governmental contracts.,
227
with the justified expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of
conduct characterized as "bad faith" because they violate community standards
of decency, fairness or reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for the breach
of the duty of good faith also varies with the circumstances.
Comment c. notes that the duty is not directly applicable to the formation of a con-
tract-primarily because there are other rules covering this area. However, this
comment states that the duty is applicable to the negotiation of modifications to a
contract. Comment d. gives.., guidance on the applicability of the duty to perform-
ance of the contract .... Comment e. provides ... guidance in the enforcement area
Nash & Cibinic, supra note 220, T 78 at 164-65.
222. 313 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1963). For an additional discussion of Woodbury, see supra
notes 121-29 accompanying text.
223. 313 F.2d at 295.
224. See, e.g., Darko v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mont. 1986) (characterizing
the government's bad faith withholding of a mortgage approval as a contract, and thus not
applicable under FTCA).
225. 872 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1989), opinion withdrawn and replaced on reh'g, 916 F.2d 1377
(9th Cir. 1990).
226. Id. at 884. The court reasoned:
[T]he Montana court's reasons for distinguishing between tort and contract actions
have nothing to do with the Tucker Act's policy of generating a uniform body of
federal law of government contracts. In determining whether appellants' "bad faith"
action is tort-based or contractual for the purposes of the Tucker Act, then, we ig-
nore the state law characterization of the claim and focus instead on the substance of
appellants' suit.
Id. at 883.
227. Id. at 884.
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Thus, the court concluded that "[s]tate law cannot, consistent with Tucker
Act, be used to write terms into government contracts., 228
One week before the Ninth Circuit announced its decision in LaPlant, a
different panel of the court had announced its decision in Love v. United
States.229 In Love, the plaintiffs, who were similarly situated to those in
LaPlant, sued the government for, inter alia, a breach of fiduciary duty and
the duty of good faith and fair dealing.23° However, unlike the LaPlant
panel, the Love court exercised tort jurisdiction and focused on whether
Montana law imposed such an obligation in tort.231  The court concluded
that under Montana law, the breach of the duty of good faith alleged by the
plaintiffs was a separate tort and was not, as concluded in Woodbury, "based
entirely upon breach by the government of a promise made by it in a con-
tract., 2 32 In the light of the Love decision, the plaintiffs in LaPlant filed a
petition for reconsideration, which was granted, but with the earlier opinion
of the court withdrawn in favor of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Love. 33
Based on the Love and LaPlant decisions, it is reasonable to conclude that
although the terms of a contract and the maintenance of a uniform body of
federal contract law are important considerations in the federal courts, they
are secondary to Congress' express intent that the federal government
should be held liable in tort if a private individual would be liable under state
tort law. Thus, if a private party would be subject to an action in tort for
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under applicable state law,
the government most likely will be subject to liability under the FTCA. 3
228. Id.
229. 915 F.2d 1242 (1988).
230. Id. at 1244.
231. Id. at 1247-48. As the court noted:
The Loves allege ... that the government breached an "implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing," which Montana recognizes as a separate cause of action in
tort. Although this duty arises between parties having a contractual relationship,
"the duty exists apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the par-
ties .... The duty is imposed by operation of law and therefore its breach should find
a remedy in tort." Montana courts imply this duty of good faith where contractual
relations are characterized by adhesion or inequality in bargaining power.
Id. (quoting Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 213, 214-15 (Mont. 1983) (omission
in original)) (citations omitted).
232. Id. at 1247 (citing Woodbury, 313 F.2d at 295).
233. See LaPlant v. United States, 916 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Love, 915 F.2d at
1242).
234. See, e.g., Meyer v. Fidelity Sav., 944 F.2d 562, 572 n.17 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was not an actionable tort under
the FTCA in that case because "under California law, it is established that 'tort remedies are
not available for breach of the implied covenant in an employment contract to employees who
allege they have been discharged in violation of the covenant.' Rather, 'contractual remedies
should remain the sole available relief' ") (citations omitted), cert. granted, 1993 U.S. LEXIS
2147 (1993); Ackerley v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 1519, 1521 (D. Wyo. 1990) (asserting
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In contrast to actions under the FTCA, there has been relatively little
analysis in Claims Court and board decisions addressing whether claims al-
leging a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing sound primarily in
tort and are thus outside the court's and boards' jurisdiction.235 This appar-
ently is due to the fact that by definition the duty "arises between parties
having a contractual relationship." '236 Consequently, the duty of good faith
and fair dealing has gained wide acceptance in government contract law.237
that "[iln suits against the United States, the law of the place where the act or omission oc-
curred governs liability. . . . The complaint states claims for conversion, negligence, and
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, all of which are recognized in Wyoming
law") (citations omitted).
235. For decisions analyzing the issue, see Boehm v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 511, 518-19
(1991) (noting that while tort claims do not fall under the Tucker Act, tortious breach of
contract claims do and consequently, the Claims Court has jurisdiction over such claims);
Gregory Lumber Co. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 503, 526 (1986) (asserting that breach of
"warranty of quantity" and "obligation to deal in good faith" do not fall "within the forbidden
category of 'sounding in tort' "); H.H.O., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 703, 708 (1985)
(stating that the court lacked jurisdiction over claim characterized "as either '[d]efamation of
reputation' or '[b]reach of contract conditions to properly inspect job and administer contract
in good faith, to cooperate and to not interfere ... by creating problems with Plaintiff's bond-
ing company'" because "both characterizations are grounded in tort-defamation or tortious
interference") (alterations in original); 6800 Corp., 81-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 15,388, at 76,237
(1981) (holding that failure to vacate a leased premises sounds both in contract and in tort); see
also Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Bad Faith: The Dark Side, 4 NASH & CIBINIC REPORT
46, at 107 (July 1990) (distinguishing between contractual bad faith, i.e., breach of the contrac-
tual duty of good faith and fair dealing, and the tort of bad faith, which requires intent to
injure, malice, or ill will).
236. Love, 915 F.2d at 1247.
237. See Nash & Cibinic, supra note 220, 78, at 171 ("The duty of good faith and fair
dealing is of such wide scope that it will be limited only by the imagination of the litigants, and
by the views of the judges regarding the amount of restraint that is necessary in its applica-
tion."); see, e.g., Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142, 156 (1991) (citing Eliel v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 461, 470 (1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 1495 (Fed. Cir. 1990), for the propo-
sition that "every contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"), sum-
mary judgment granted, 26 Cl. Ct. 1249 (1992); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E.
JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 670 (3d ed. 1961) (explaining that breach of an implied
promise sounds in contract)). In Solar Turbines, the plaintiffs claimed that the Navy acted in
bad faith by inducing plaintiff to invest funds in a contract beyond the contract's ceiling price
so that such overruns ultimately would result in the plaintiff seeking termination. Solar Tur-
bines, 23 Cl. Ct. at 156-57. This claim was adequate to survive the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Id.
Moreover, as the Federal Circuit has held, the duty is not subordinate to fiscal constraints.
See New England Tank Indus. v. United States, 861 F.2d 685, 694 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Nor do
we view the public fisc so sacrosanct in each and every case as to place its protection before the
candor and fair dealing a free society is entitled to expect from its government."), petition
denied, 865 F.2d 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In New England Tank, the Federal Circuit vacated and
remanded the decision of the board in favor of the government, where the contractor sought
equitable adjustment after it learned that the government agent had lacked authority to con-
tinue renewing the contract at below-market price. Id.
See also Juda v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 441 (1984) (examining whether the government may
be liable in contract for a breach of fiduciary duty, regardless of the fact that the breach may
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VII. CONTRACT JURISDICTION OVER ACTIONS SPECIFICALLY
EXCLUDED FROM FTCA JURISDICTION
As sections III, IV, V, and VI of this Article demonstrate, there is a signif-
icant jurisdictional overlap between tort claims brought under the FTCA
and contract claims asserted under the CDA and Tucker Act. Perhaps the
most significant implication of this overlap becomes apparent when the con-
tractor is the victim of tortious conduct that the FTCA expressly excludes
from the district courts' jurisdiction.23 As the Supreme Court observed,
"neither the existence of a tort remedy nor the lack of one is relevant to
determining whether there is [a] .. .contract ... upon which the United
States is liable in the Court of Claims pursuant to its waiver of sovereign
immunity contained in the Tucker Act. '239 Consequently, contractors have
had some success in asserting that the otherwise excluded tortious conduct
also constitutes a breach of contract that is actionable under the CDA and
Tucker Act.2 " This tortious conduct includes: (1) misrepresentation; (2)
tortious interference with contract rights; and (3) libel and slander. 241
also sound in tort). In Juda, the plaintiffs, who were inhabitants of the Marshall Islands,
alleged that the United States had breached the fiduciary obligations of an implied-in-fact con-
tract connected with the government's relocation of the islands for the purpose of conducting
nuclear testing. Id. at 451-52. The government filed a motion to dismiss, contending, inter
alia, that the plaintiffs' claim sounded in tort and therefore the court had no jurisdiction. Id.
at 453. The Claims Court denied the motion, rejecting the government's contention that the
breach of a fiduciary duty might also sound in tort. Id. The court noted that "where an
enforceable contract is alleged, an action for breach is not beyond the scope of the Tucker Act
simply because elements of tort are present." Id. But see C.B.C. Enters. v. United States, 24
Cl. Ct. 1, 5 (1991) (holding that there was no jurisdiction because "such generalized obliga-
tions as, not interfering with the other party's performance, or failure to act in good faith, must
have a contract performance referent to have any relevance"). For further discussion of the
duty of good faith, see supra note 158.
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988) (listing exemptions to the district court's jurisdiction).
239. Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 466 (1980) (holding that the
United States may be liable under the Tucker Act for breach of an implied contract of bail-
ment when goods held by the U.S. Customs Service are lost even though 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)
prohibits claims arising from the detention of merchandise by customs officials).
240. See generally 2 RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN CIBINIC, JR., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
LAW: CONTRACT PERFORMANCE 2224 (3d ed. 1980). Nash and Cibinic state that:
As a practical matter the contractor has little to gain by characterizing the matter as
sounding in tort because of the Federal Tort Claims Act's broad exceptions to the
Government's waiver of immunity from liability in tort, 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Accord-
ingly, contractors have usually been strongly motivated to have their claims charac-
terized as sounding in contract, and remediable under the Tucker Act.
Id. (citations omitted).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988), which provides:
§ 2680. Exceptions.
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
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A. Misrepresentation
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), the provisions of the FTCA do not apply to
"[any claim arising out of ... misrepresentation. ' 24 2 Unfortunately for
victims of misrepresentation committed by the government, the federal dis-
trict courts have broadly construed § 2680 to exclude "all actions for deceit
and misrepresentations whether the misrepresentations were made deliber-
ately, recklessly or negligently. '24 3 Thus, in spite of attempts at creative
pleading by many contractors, the courts have consistently denied jurisdic-
tion under the FTCA to any claim that involves any form of misrepresenta-
tion.2' As a result of this consistently adverse FTCA case law, contractors
often have elected to pursue their claims for misrepresentation in contract.
In determining whether to assert jurisdiction over such claims, the Claims
Court and boards have focused on whether: (1) there is a relevant implied
obligation under the contract; and (2) the claim seeks contract and not tort
damages.245
It is a generally accepted premise that in order to prevail against the gov-
ernment in a case for misrepresentation, a contractor must demonstrate that:
(1) the government made an erroneous representation; (2) the representation
was material; (3) the representation induced the contractor into entering the
contract; (4) the contractor had the legal right to rely on the representation;
and (5) the contractor did rely on the representation to the contractor's in-
jury.246 This is consistent with the elements of the cause of action at com-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit,
or interference with contract rights ....
Id.
242. Id.
243. Covington v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (citing Hall v.
United States, 274 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1959); Jones v. United States, 207 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 921 (1954)).
244. See, e.g., Leaf v. United States, 661 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1981) (barring under the
exclusion, a claim by the owners of an aircraft that was leased by a DEA informant based upon
misrepresentation as to its intended use, a drug smuggling operation), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
960 (1982); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 177 (8th Cir. 1978) (barring a con-
struction contractor's claim for reformation of closing documents, where claim was essentially
one for misrepresentation of developer's ability to pay construction notes); United States v.
Croft-Mullins Elec. Co., 333 F.2d 772, 780 (5th Cir. 1964) (characterizing a contractor's claim
based on the government's late delivery of materials as the government's misrepresentation of
its ability to provide materials and thus barring the claim under the exclusion), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 968 (1965); Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 768, 772 (W.D.
Okla. 1969) (barring claim for failure of government to give to the contractor the location of a
pipeline that ruptured the pipeline during performance).
245. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
246. JOHN C. MCBRIDE, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 13.30 (1990).
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mon law.2 47 What is somewhat less well-articulated is the source of the
contractor's legal right to rely on the representation. While the Claims
Court and board cases generally are "remarkably silent ' 248 with respect to
the source of this right, it apparently flows from the government's implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing to those contractors from whom the gov-
ernment solicits its work.
249
Although the source is not always articulated, the Claims Court and
boards have recognized an implied contractual duty. In American Ship
Building Co. ,25o the plaintiff alleged a breach by misrepresentation by the
government in the award of a contract to the plaintiff for construction of an
oceanographic survey ship. The plaintiff alleged that the government had
" 'special knowledge'" that the mandatory terms of the plaintiff's bid solici-
tation were commercially impractical, i.e., that the ship could not be com-
pleted in 900 days, as contracted, due to known technical difficulties. 251 The
plaintiff also alleged that the price bid was impractical because the govern-
ment knew of the failures and overruns associated with construction con-
tracts of three similar earlier oceanographic vessels.252 The government filed
a motion for summary judgment, requesting the court to dismiss the action
as a tort claim.253 The court, however, denied the government's motion and
247. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979). The Restatement sets
forth the requirements that must be shown in order to make a contract voidable due to misrep-
resentation: (1) there must have been a misrepresentation; (2) the misrepresentation must have
been fraudulent or material; (3) the misrepresentation must have induced the recipient to make
the contract; and (4) the recipient's reliance must have been justified. Id.
248. Michael J. Hoover, Government Affirmative Misrepresentation in Federal Contracting,
25 A.F.L. REV. 183, 183 (1985), reprinted in 23 YEARBOOK OF PROCUREMENT ARTICLES 187
(1986).
249. See Gregory Lumber Co. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 503, 526 (1986) (asserting that in
a contract claim alleging misrepresentation, the duty breached is "the obligation to deal in
good faith"); see also Hoover, supra note 248, at 183 (citing Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States,
586 F.2d 774 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Bateson-Stolte, Inc. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 454, 457 (Ct.
Cl. 1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979)); CIBINIC & NASH, supra
note 61, at 184 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); UCC § 1-202
(1978) ("Government liability for nondisclosure of information is based on an implied duty to
disclose information which is vital for the preparation of estimates or for contract perform-
ance. This implied duty is consistent with the general contract law concepts of good faith and
fair dealing.")). See generally Alan Gould et al., The Government's Duty To Communicate -
An Expanding Obligation, 18 NAT'L CONT. MGMT. J. 45 (1984), reprinted in 21 YEARBOOK
OF PROCUREMENT ARTICLES 654 (John W. Whelan, ed., 1984); Gregory G. Sarno, Annota-
tion, Public Contracts. Duty of Public Authority to Disclose to Contractor Information, Allegedly
in its Possession, Affecting Cost or Feasibility of Project, 86 A.L.R.3d 182 (1978).
250. 207 Ct. Cl. 1002 (1975).
251. Id. at 1002-03.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1003-04.
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refused to dismiss the plaintiff's claim merely because it also sounded in
tort.
2 54
The Claims Court also recognizes that an implied duty exists in the pre-
award time frame, before the parties even have entered into a contract.255
As long as there is a sufficient nexus between that contractual duty and the
tortious conduct, the Claims Court will recognize an action in contract.
256
Moreover, while apparently not a determinative factor, both the Claims
Court and boards will exam the nature of the damages sought in order to
determine whether the action sounds in contract.257 Thus, the contractor
who falls victim to a government misrepresentation may find relief in the
Claims Court and boards in spite of the FTCA's express exclusion.
B. Tortious Interference
Under § 2680(h), the provisions of the FTCA also do not apply to claims
arising out of interference with contract rights.258 Like misrepresentation,
the federal district courts have interpreted broadly the tortious interference
exclusion. Unlike misrepresentation, however, there is generally no corre-
sponding contract duty over which the Claims Court or boards may assert
jurisdiction.
The FTCA does not define the phrase "interference with contract rights."
At common law, "interference with contract rights" refers to a relatively
broad spectrum of conduct involving intentional interference with current as
well as future contracts.259 The federal district courts have recognized the
254. Id.
255. See Gregory Lumber Co. v. United States, 9 CI. Ct. 503, 526 (1986) (citing Florida
Keys Aqueduct Auth. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 911, 912 (1982)).
256. Hartle v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 479, 483 (1989), complaint dismissed, 22 Cl. Ct. 843
(1991); cf. Jay Rucker, 80-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 14,512, at 71,533 (1980) ("Since Appellant's
claim for the costs he incurred does not arise relative to a contract made by the Forest Service
but instead is based on alleged misrepresentation or improper actions by Forest Service officials
on which he relied to his detriment, his complaint would appear to sound in tort."). The
boards historically did not have jurisdiction over tortious breaches of contract generally and
misrepresentation specifically. See, e.g., Delphi Indus., Inc., 78-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 13,058, at
63,752 (1978); Cheves Constr. Co., 71-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 8,937, at 41,553 (1971); Lenoir Wood
Finishing Co., 1964 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 4,111, at 20,059 (1964); Joseph F. Monsini, Jr., 61-2
B.C.A. (CCH) 3,197, at 16,569 (1961). The boards have recognized their authority under
the CDA to hear such claims. See Kolar, Inc., 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 117,044, at 86,856 (1983).
257. Compare Kolar Inc., 84-1 B.C.A. (CCH) $ 17,044, at 84,856 (exercising contract ju-
risdiction where the "complaint does not use the word 'tort', nor does it claim tort damages
.... In substance, appellant here seeks only contract damages") with Transcounty Packing
Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 1333, 1338 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (denying contract jurisdiction where
"the very nature of the damages claimed by the plaintiff clearly reflected that the plaintiff's
petition was in tort).
258. 28 U.S.C. § 2600(h) (1988).
259. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977) ("Intentional Interference with
Performance of Contract by Third Person"); id. § 766A ("Intentional Interference with An-
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correspondingly broad nature of the exclusion, for example, by declining to
exercise jurisdiction over tort claims brought by government contractors
who seek damages associated with the award of contracts. 2" The results in
the Claims Court and boards are no better for contractors alleging interfer-
ence. Such cases are routinely dismissed because there simply is no applica-
ble contractual obligation.26 1 Thus, the contractor that falls victim to
tortious interference by the government is generally without a remedy. Such
an action is barred under the FTCA and generally does not give rise to the
breach of a contractual provision so as to invoke CDA or Tucker Act
jurisdiction.
C. Libel and Slander
Finally, § 2680(h) also expressly bars actions arising out of libel and slan-
der. Like misrepresentation and interference, the exception is broadly
applied to tortious conduct. 262 Unfortunately for contractors, like interfer-
ence, there is no relevant contractual duty over which the Claims Court and
boards may assert jurisdiction.263 In addition, like misrepresentation and
interference, the FTCA does not define libel or slander, nor does it employ
other's Performance of His Own Contract"); id. § 766B ("Intentional Interference with Pro-
spective Contractual Relation").
260. See, e.g., Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1155 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (holding exclusion applies not only to interference with existing contract, but also to
interference with prospective advantage); Armstrong & Armstrong, Inc. v. United States, 356
F. Supp. 514, 521 (E.D. Wash. 1973) (barring under exclusion, a claim alleging that govern-
ment acted negligently in the award of a contract), aff'd, 514 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1975); Taxay
v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 1284, 1286 (D.D.C. 1972) (barring under the exclusion, claim
seeking damages resulting from the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration to renew
the appointment of the plaintiff as a medical examiner, aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
261. See, e.g., Fort Sill Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 636, 639 (Ct. Cl. 1966)
(barring a claim for ruinous competition); H.H.O., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 703, 708
(1985) (claim alleging interference with performance "by creating problems with plaintiff's
bonding company"); Pinkston v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 263 (1984) (barring a claim for inter-
ference and harassment leading to losses); Williamson v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 239, 245
(1964) (barring a claim alleging violations of constitution and regulations leading to termina-
tion); Associated Contract Specialties Corp., 90-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 23,258, at 116,693 (1990)
(barring a claim that a contractor lost the contract due to the wrongful acts of government);
EDL Constr., Inc., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,313, at 102,707 (1987) (barring a claim alleging
that the contracting officer interfered with contractor's business relationships by sending a
defamatory letter to SBA). But see Olin Jones Sand Co. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 741
(1980), where a claim alleging that the government breached its contractual obligation to make
timely payments resulting in the contractor's inability to get other work was not barred. Thus,
the contractor's success in maintaining a claim may hinge on the ability to point to a contrac-
tual obligation.
262. See, e.g., Art Metal-U.S.A., 753 F.2d at 1151.
263. See, e.g., Algonac Mfg. Co. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1241 (Ct. Cl. 1970); EDL
Constr., Inc., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,313, at 102,707 (1987).
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the more general term, defamation, which covers all manners of injuries to
reputation.2 6 In spite of this arguably limiting language, the libel and slan-
der exclusion has been broadly applied to include related torts that extend
beyond the technical boundaries of libel, slander and defamation. 265
Unfortunately for the contractor, there is no corresponding contractual
duty that is breached by the government's libelous or slanderous acts. The
results are equally dismal in the Claims Court
2 6 6 and with the boards.2 67
Thus, as is the case with interference, the government contractor that is the
victim of government libel and slander and related conduct is without an
avenue for relief.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the best evidence of the increasing overlap between the tort and
contract jurisdiction of the federal district courts, Claims Court, and boards,
respectively, is the judicial recognition that: (1) a traditionally contractual
obligation, such as the duty of good faith and fair dealing, is actionable
under the FTCA; and (2) a traditionally tortious action, such as misrepre-
sentation, is available under the Tucker Act and the CDA. As the Ninth
Circuit stated in Love, although the duty of good faith and fair dealing
"arises between parties having a contractual relationship, 'the duty exists
apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties .... The
duty is imposed by operation of law and therefore its breach should find a
remedy in tort.' ,'268 Likewise, as the Supreme Court stated in Hatzlachh
Supply, 269 "neither the existence of a tort remedy nor the lack of one is
relevant to determining whether there is an implied-in-fact contract ... upon
which the United States is liable in the Court of Claims. '2 70 Thus, it would
appear that as long as the plaintiff can establish an action in tort under state
law or establish an obligation under the contract, the plaintiff may success-
fully assert tort or contract jurisdiction, respectively, regardless of whether
there also happens to be a corresponding contract or tort duty.
However, while the trend appears to be towards increasingly overlapping
jurisdiction between the tort and contract forums, there are still too many
264. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 559-68A (1976).
265. See, e.g., Art Metal-U.S.A., 753 F.2d at 1155 (barring a claim for "injurious false-
hood" resulting in injury to and destruction of "standing, reputation, prestige, and goodwill").
266. See, e.g., Frawley v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 766 (1988); H.H.O., Inc., 7 Cl. Ct. at
703; Algonac Mfg., 428 F.2d at 1241; Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
267. See, e.g., EDL Construction, Inc., 88-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 20,313 (1987); Adams, 87-3
B.C.A. (CCH) 20,205 (1987).
268. 915 F.2d 1242, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co.,
668 P.2d 213, 214-15 (Mont. 1983)).
269. 444 U.S. 460 (1980).
270. Id. at 466.
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jurisdictional pitfalls for the victim of a tortious breach of contract by the
government. In Manshul Construction Corp. v. United States,2 7' Judge
Dearie summarized the unfortunate legacy that Congress has bequeathed to
contractors who seek to redress wrongs committed by the federal govern-
ment:
The King, it was held at English common law, could do no wrong.
When "a long train of abuses and usurpations" by George III
proved otherwise, events were set in motion that culminated in the
formation of a government that, by the terms of its constitutive
document, could do wrong if it exceeded its limited powers. That
the rights of individuals against the government can meaningfully
be vindicated at all in courts that are organs of that government is
one of the miracles of American constitutional democracy.
The Framers' thaumaturgy, however, was less than complete:
the hoary tradition endures that redress against the government
can be had only by its consent, in the forum of its choice, and for
only such relief to which it acquiesces. The immunity thus granted
to the sovereign, whatever its virtues, has undeniably produced an
uneven topography of standing and jurisdiction that leaves some
litigants on terra firma while others languish in the twilight
zone.
272
It is not surprising then, that at least one "ancient philosopher" of the gov-
ernment contracts bar has gone so far as to call for the repeal of the CDA
and Tucker Act, the abolition of the Claims Court and boards (at least in
their present form), and the expansion of the jurisdiction for the federal dis-
trict courts.
2 7 3
271. 687 F. Supp. 60 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
272. Id. at 60, quoted in Quips & Quotes, 4 NASH & CIBINIc REPORT $ 75 (Dec. 1990).
273. See Herbert L. Fenster, The Fork in the Road-Which Route to Resolution? Poor
Choices, Address to the Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit at 3 (May 9, 1991) (transcript on file with the author). Mr.
Fenster asserted that:
The current jurisdictional football game that is going on involving certification on the
one hand and what constitutes a dispute on the other hand would be kindergarten
comedy were it not for the fact that my clients' time and money is involved. It is
simply a shabby and stupid distortion of the disputes process, utterly inexplicable to
our lay clients-or ourselves for that matter.
I propose to you that the Contract Disputes Act should be repealed. Moreover, we
should return to secretarial boards: the genuinely authorized representative of the
secretary should resolve contract disputes. This should be an administrative process,
not Article I judicial litigation.
If you think that proposal is revolutionary, I've got another for you: I oppose,
vehemently, all specialized courts, whether they are Article I or Article III. Under
the Constitution there is no accounting for them; they are anathema to our system of
jurisprudence. They exist in my view ostensibly because Congress has written laws
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While neither of these observations specifically address the scenario of the
contractor that seeks to redress the government's tortious breach of con-
tract, the remarks are equally apt in that context. Such a contractor must
bear the burden of successfully navigating the jurisdictional labyrinth cre-
ated through no fewer than six statutes governing litigation in three forums.
Burdened by the additional cost and time associated with the administrative
claims process that precedes de novo judicial review, the contractor becomes
twice victimized: once by the tortious breach and once by the dispute resolu-
tion process itself.
The goal of this Article is to assist the contractor in bringing an actionable
claim in the proper forum. Additionally, this exercise implicitly serves the
purpose of demonstrating that reform is needed. Such reform might expand
the jurisdiction of the federal district courts to include contract claims, so
that victims of tortious breaches of contract by the government would be
able to plead in the alternative, a right that Congress already generally has
granted to plaintiffs against the government under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.27 4 Alternatively and less drastically, such reform might expand
the jurisdiction of the Claims Court to include ancillary jurisdiction under
the FTCA over tort claims that are related to claims already within the
court's jurisdiction. In fact, legislation was introduced during the 102d Con-
gress which would have granted the Claims Court this power.27 5
Regardless of the specific details of any particular legislative proposal,
however, one thing is clear: Congress must act to save contractors, the gov-
ernment, the courts, and ultimately the taxpayers, from the needless expense
of litigating where to litigate.276
too complex for lay people and judges to understand. In reality, they exist to give the
government an advantage which it does not deserve in litigating cases against it.
For this reason, I believe that "appeals" from determinations of service boards
should go, de novo, to the US District Courts.... I would, in the process, repeal the
Tucker Act: It is my view that, once the government has waived its sovereign immu-
nity to suits in contract and for takings, there is no excuse in law or equity for limit-
ing the access of Americans to their courts of general jurisdiction.
I should tell you that my views are shared, in one manifestation or another, by a
large percentage of my clients and by the aerospace and defense community.
Id. at 4-5.
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